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8 A later Hellenistic debate about the value of Classical Athenian civic ideals? The 
evidence of epigraphy, historiography and philosophy 
Benjamin Gray (University of Edinburgh) 
 
8.1 Introduction1 
 
This chapter seeks to complement this volume’s studies of particular mid- and later Hellenistic 
authors (Polybius, Diodorus Siculus, Dionysius of Halicarnassus), by offering a wide-ranging 
interpretation of the place of Classical Athens in later Hellenistic civic culture and political 
debates. It discusses, and places in its first-century BC context, the Stoic Posidonius’ account 
of unrest in Athens in 88 BC, during the First Mithridatic War. It compares the ideas advocated 
by Posidonius in that account with those expressed in a range of contemporary texts. The 
resulting argument is that this comparison reveals traces of a lively later Hellenistic debate 
among Greek intellectuals and politically-active citizens about the value of different Classical 
Athenian civic ideals, both democratic and philosophical, in the new world of Roman power. 
This was a debate about whether different traditional civic ideals were vital or outdated, 
liberating or constraining, exemplary or questionable. 
 
In concentrating on ideas about the status of the Athenian political past, this chapter offers a 
different perspective on the broader debates in the mid- and later Hellenistic world, well and 
intensively studied by modern scholars, about the political and moral questions arising from 
                                                 
1 I am very grateful for help with this chapter to Mirko Canevaro, Matthias Haake, Alex Long, 
John Ma, Manuela Mari, Paraskevi Martzavou, John Thornton, Ulrike Roth and the anonymous 
reviewers for OUP.  
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the Roman conquest.2 It does so partly by giving weight to marginal, or submerged, views, 
preserved now only in asides in literary texts or in inscriptions, which suffered for their 
divergence from an emerging new consensus in the Roman world. The chapter is thus also an 
example of how comparing literary texts with inscriptions’ rhetoric can lead to more complex 
and multi-faceted reconstructions of ancient ethical and political debates. 
 
The first half of the article (sections 2 and 3) analyses the better preserved evidence for one 
side in these debates: the arguments of critics of certain Classical Athenian civic ideals, 
especially more utopian and community-centred ones. The second half (section 4) argues that 
it is also possible to excavate traces of the other side in these debates: the arguments of later 
Hellenistic thinkers and citizens who insisted on the continuing importance of those more 
community-centred Classical Athenian ideals. 
 
8.2 Posidonius’ Athenion: Radically Democratic Classicism 
 
In the course of the second century BC, the Romans established a dominant position in the 
Eastern Mediterranean. In the early first century BC, King Mithridates VI of Pontus led a revolt 
against Roman power in the Greek world, in what was to become known as the First Mithridatic 
War (89–85 BC). By 88 BC Athens had problems of its own. The traditional democratic 
Athenian constitution had probably remained in force, perhaps in diluted form, until very 
recently, when it had been suspended. The details are obscure, but it seems that repeated 
archonships by a single individual (Medeios) from 91/0 BC, and possibly also accompanying 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Bowersock 1965; Deininger 1971; Ferrary 1988; Thornton 1999; Champion 
2004a. 
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internal unrest, had led one or more Athenian factions to appeal to the Roman Senate. In 
response, the Senate had probably ordered the temporary suspension of normal democratic 
institutions while it deliberated about Athens’ problems. It was in these circumstances that the 
Athenians became involved in Mithridates’ revolt.3 
 
Posidonius’ highly satirical and exaggerated,4 but also analytical,5 account of how the 
Athenians joined Mithridates6 is quoted at length,7 perhaps with some modifications or 
                                                 
3 On the background, see Badian 1976: esp. 106–108, 112; Malitz 1983: 340–57; Kidd 1988–
1999: vol. II ii), 866–9; Habicht 1997: ch. 13; Haake 2007: 271–3; Grieb 2008: 132–8. 
4 See Ferrary 1988: 473, with IG II2 1714. 
5 Hahm 1989: 1328–31; Kidd (1997). 
6 This is Posidonius fr. 253 (= Athen. Deipnosophistae Book V, 211d–215d); see also now BNJ 
87 F36 (edition, translation and commentary by K. Dowden). All Posidonius fragments are 
cited here by Edelstein-Kidd numbers. I have been guided in my translations of Posidonius by 
Kidd’s. 
7 On the likelihood that Athenaeus quotes Posidonius directly at length here, compare most 
recently K. Dowden in BNJ 87 F36, citing earlier bibliography. This view was also defended 
by the principal modern expert on Posidonius, I.G. Kidd, on the basis of the style and language 
of the fragment: ‘this looks to me like straight Posidonius, a quotation: the language is 
Posidonian and certainly not Athenaean’ (Kidd 1997: 41; compare Kidd 1988–1999, vol. II ii): 
865; compare). Kidd also points out that Athenaeus introduces the account as a direct quotation: 
he says he will set out what Posidonius writes about Athenion, ‘though it is rather long’; that 
would be a strange way to describe a paraphrase. Athenaeus’ other uses of the same verb, 
ἐκθήσομαι, introduce verbatim quotations: see Deipnosophistae Book IX, 374a2–5; compare 
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editing,8 by Athenaeus. According to Posidonius, the mediator between Athens and Mithridates 
was a teacher of philosophy with Peripatetic leanings: the Athenian citizen Athenion. 
Posidonius introduces Athenion as the son of an Athenian citizen, also called Athenion, who 
had been a keen disciple of the leading Peripatetic Erymneus. The younger Athenion’s mother 
was an Egyptian slave-girl, but he was illegitimately smuggled onto the Athenian citizen-roll. 
Posidonius then describes Athenion’s early life as a ‘sophist’ in Messene and Larissa.9 This is 
in itself an interesting indication, very relevant to this volume, of the continuing prominence 
of Classical Athenian political and political philosophical discourse in the first century BC: 
Posidonius mobilises one of the main forms of Classical democratic invective, a charge of low, 
foreign birth and illegitimate citizenship,10 alongside one of the leading forms of Classical 
Athenian philosophical invective, a charge of sophistry. The fact that some earlier Stoics had 
been less instinctively hostile to sophistry as an occupation, at least for the wise man (see 
Long’s chapter in this volume), reinforces the point that Posidonius’ approach harks back to a 
Classical mindset. 
 
                                                 
Book III, 95a6–7. Direct quotation would also explain why Athenaeus introduces Posidonius 
as a philosopher active in Athens, Messene and Larissa, but Athenaeus is then presented 
(slightly differently) as a ‘teacher’ or ‘sophist’ working in these cities in the opening part of 
the main narrative, as if this is new information. 
8 Compare Malitz 1983: 341. 
9 Posidonius fr. 253, ll. 12–23. For philosophical teaching at Larissa in this period, compare 
Haake 2009; 2010. 
10 Compare Kidd 1988–1999, vol. II ii): 866; 1997: 42. 
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In Posidonius’s account, the Athenian people elect Athenion as their envoy to Mithridates when 
Mithridates’ revolt is gaining steam in Asia Minor. Athenion ingratiates himself with 
Mithridates, to the extent that he can write letters to the Athenians claiming that he is most 
influential with him, such that, ‘not only having been released from their pressing debts, but 
also having recovered their democracy, they will live in concord and receive great gifts, both 
as individuals and as a community’ (μὴ μόνον τῶν ἐπιφερομένων ὀφλημάτων ἀπολυθέντας, 
ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἀνακτησαμένους ἐν ὁμονοίᾳ ζῆν καὶ δωρεῶν μεγάλων τυχεῖν ἰδίᾳ 
καὶ δημοσίᾳ). After Posidonius’ Athenians respond enthusiastically to this proposal, Athenion 
makes an extravagant return to Athens, to a rapturous reception.11 
 
A large crowd of Athenians and foreigners assembles in the Kerameikos and an assembly 
congregates. Posidonius’ Athenion then stands on the podium built for the Roman praetors, 
before the Stoa of Attalos. Standing amidst these symbols of the patronage and power of 
external potentates in Hellenistic Athens, Athenion gives a speech emphasising traditional 
Athenian civic virtues and freedoms. He begins by claiming that, though his ‘country’s interest’ 
(τὸ τῆς πατρίδος συμφέρον) is driving him to speak, the magnitude of his message is holding 
him back. After setting aside this feigned reluctance, Athenion then gives a detailed account of 
the remarkable developments in Asia Minor, before predicting that Mithridates’ revolt will 
spread to Europe.12 He then concludes by appealing to Athens’ proud traditions: 
 
‘τί οὖν’ εἶπε ‘συμβουλεύω; μὴ ἀνέχεσθαι τῆς ἀναρχίας, ἣν ἡ Ῥωμαίων σύγκλητος 
ἐπισχεθῆναι πεποίηκεν, ἕως <ἂν> αὐτὴ δοκιμάσῃ περὶ τοῦ πῶς ἡμᾶς πολιτεύεσθαι δεῖ. 
                                                 
11 Posidonius fr. 253, ll. 23–58. 
12 Posidonius fr. 253, ll. 58–92. 
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καὶ μὴ περιίδωμεν τὰ ἱερὰ κεκλῃμένα, αὐχμῶντα δὲ τὰ γυμνάσια, τὸ δὲ θέατρον 
ἀνεκκλησίαστον, ἄφωνα δὲ τὰ δικαστήρια καὶ τὴν θεῶν χρησμοῖς καθωσιωμένην 
Πύκνα ἀφῃρημένην τοῦ δήμου. μὴ περιίδωμεν δέ, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὴν ἱερὰν τοῦ 
Ἰάκχου φωνὴν κατασεσιγασμένην καὶ τὸ σεμνὸν ἀνάκτορον τοῖν θεοῖν κεκλῃμένον καὶ 
τῶν φιλοσόφων τὰς διατριβὰς ἀφώνους.’ πολλῶν οὖν καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων λεχθέντων 
ὑπὸ τοῦ οἰκότριβος, συλλαλήσαντες αὑτοῖς οἱ ὄχλοι καὶ συνδραμόντες εἰς τὸ θέατρον 
εἵλοντο τὸν Ἀθηνίωνα στρατηγὸν ἐπὶ τῶν ὅπλων. καὶ παρελθὼν ὁ Περιπατητικὸς εἰς 
τὴν ὀρχήστραν, ‘ἴσα βαίνων Πυθοκλεῖ’ εὐχαρίστησέ τε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ ἔφη διότι 
‘νῦν ὑμεῖς ἑαυτῶν στρατηγεῖτε, προέστηκα δ’ ἐγώ. καὶ ἂν συνεπισχύσητε, τοσοῦτον 
δυνήσομαι ὅσον κοινῇ πάντες ὑμεῖς.’ 
“What then,” he said, ‘”do I advise? Do not tolerate the anarchy which the Roman 
Senate has caused to be drawn out until it reaches a decision about how we should 
conduct our civic life. And let us not look on passively at our sanctuaries closed, our 
gymnasia abandoned, the theatre without assemblies, the law-courts without a voice, 
and the Pnyx, blessed with oracles of the gods, taken away from the people. And let us 
not tolerate, men of Athens, the sacred voice of Iacchus silenced, the holy temple of the 
two gods shut, and the schools of the philosophers without a voice.” After many other 
such things had been said by this common slave, the masses burst into chatter and came 
running together into the theatre, where they elected Athenion hoplite general. And the 
Peripatetic, having come onto the orchestra, ‘walking like Pythocles’, thanked the 
Athenians and said: “Now you are in command of yourselves, and I have taken on the 
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leading position. And if you combine your strength, I will be as powerful as all of you 
collectively.”13  
 
Despite his promise that they will now govern themselves, the new strategos Athenion then 
seizes power and governs as a tyrant, keeping tight controls on the population and organising 
unsuccessful foreign ventures.14 Little is known about the final fall of Athenion’s regime. 
Either his regime or, more probably, that of a successor, another philosophical tyrant, an 
Epicurean called Aristion,15 was violently and decisively overthrown by Sulla’s army in 86 
BC.  
 
Posidonius thus offers a very striking account of a Peripatetic philosopher leading a radically 
democratic revolt in Athens in 88 BC. This is surprising to anyone familiar with earlier 
Athenian and Peripatetic ideology,16 and earlier uneasy relations between Peripatetics and the 
Athenian democracy.17 Some Hellenistic Peripatetics had enjoyed esteem in the Athenian 
                                                 
13 Posidonius fr. 253, ll. 94–110. As Ferrary (1988: 443–4) points out, there is obvious 
exaggeration in Athenion’s claims about anarchy: he has recently himself been appointed 
ambassador. 
14 Posidonius fr. 253, ll. 111–179. 
15 On the relationship between Athenion and Aristion, see Kidd 1988–1999, vol. II ii): 884–6. 
16 Note, for example, the severe criticisms of radical democracy in Aristotle’s Politics. 
17 Compare Canevaro, this volume, for early Hellenistic Peripatetic attacks on the anti-
Macedonian democratic arguments and actions of Demosthenes. Another probable case is 
Demetrios of Phaleron’s role in running a non-democratic regime in Athens (317–307 BC), 
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democracy, and even participated in its civic and diplomatic life,18 but it is still surprising to 
find in Posidonius’ account a Peripatetic enthusiastically promoting, rather than simply 
collaborating with, Athenian democracy. Many modern historians have been highly sceptical 
of the historical accuracy of Posidonius’ account, for this and other reasons. For example, 
some, such as Badian and Kallet-Marx, argue that Posidonius gives a highly misleading 
impression of popular revolt and even class conflict in Athens at this point.19 
 
I will return briefly in the conclusion to the historical plausibility of Posidonius’ account, but 
my focus is the account itself as key evidence for Posidonius’ own political thinking and 
targets. Posidonius’ Athenion is partly the stereotypical tyrant of much Greek historiography;20 
the development of his behaviour resembles, for example, that of Xenophon’s Euphron of 
Sikyon, who also eventually emerges as a fully-fledged, oppressive tyrant after initially 
ambiguous political promises.21 This further confirms the prominence of Classical Athenian 
models, in this case historiographical invective, in later Hellenistic debates. However, 
Posidonius’ presentation is more subtle than a simple tyrannical stereotype: as clear from the 
quotation above, he gives Athenion highly idealistic, egalitarian and republican rhetoric, far 
more elaborate even than the promises of democracy given by Xenophon’s Euphron. 
                                                 
though the extent of his Peripatetic attachments and inspirations is debated, with some 
favouring scepticism: see Haake 2007: 60–82, esp. 67–9.  
18 See IG II³ 1147 (226/5 BC), honouring the Peripatetic Prytanis of Karystos. 
19 Badian 1976: esp. 105, 108, 113; Kallet-Marx 1995: 207–208. Contrast, for example, Malitz 
1983: 345; Grieb 2008: 132–8. 
20 Compare Bringmann 1997. 
21 Compare especially Xen. Hell. 7.1.44–6. 
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Even if Athenaeus did modify Posidonius’ original account, it is highly unlikely that 
Athenaeus, rather than Posidonius, invented these parts of Athenion’s rhetoric. Athenaeus’ aim 
in this part of his work was to present examples of philosophers shamelessly contravening their 
doctrines, not expressing idealistic views, when participating in public life.22 The more 
idealistic rhetoric attributed to him, almost certainly by Posidonius himself, serves partly to 
paint Athenion as a familiar radical democrat or demagogue.23 Nevertheless, there is much 
more to Posidonius’ portrayal of Athenion’s ideology and rhetoric. When his Athenion appeals 
to the Athenians not to allow their civic traditions to be neglected, he refers with enthusiasm, 
not only to the democratic institutions of Pnyx and courts and to Athenian religious traditions,24 
but also to Athens’ cultural and educational institutions, including even the gymnasia and 
philosophical schools. This seemingly elevated intellectual and cultural interest is hardly 
characteristic of a stereotypical bloodthirsty and shameless demagogue. 
 
Moreover, many of Athenion’s ideals had long been cherished by both democrats and non-
democrats. Appeals to Athens’ gods and religious traditions were certainly not the sole preserve 
of democrats. Similarly, Athenion’s appeal to the Athenian people to take their future in their 
own hands, rather than allow their magistracies and institutions to lie vacant through ἀναρχία 
(‘anarchy’ or ‘absence of magistrates’), evokes generic Classical civic ideals of collective 
                                                 
22 Compare Athen. Deipnosophistae Book V, 211de; 215bc (discussing Lysias, Epicurean 
tyrant of Tarsus).  
23 Compare Deininger 1971: 248–55; Badian 1976: 112; Malitz 1983: 348–52; Gruen 1984: 
353; Dowden in BNJ 87 F36. 
24 For religion and demagogic rhetoric, compare Mari (2003). 
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participation, vibrant institutions, civic autonomy and civic self-sufficiency. In addition, 
Athenion has already appealed to other generic civic values which were certainly not uniquely 
democratic: for example, both concord (ὁμόνοια) and the common good of the polis (τὸ τῆς 
πατρίδος συμφέρον). 
 
Posidonius’ Athenion should therefore be seen as drawing on, and manipulating, a generic 
Classical civic ideal, which had been embraced across the social and ideological spectrum in 
Classical Athens: the good polis should be a close-knit community of educated, virtuous civic 
friends, dedicated to their city’s political, religious and cultural life, who govern themselves 
through informed political participation and law. This was certainly not the sole ‘Classical’ 
civic ideal: Classical Greeks held a very wide range of ideas about the good polis.25 The 
approach identified here had, however, long been widely popular, across the Greek civic world. 
Despite this ideal’s wide popularity, Posidonius’ Athenion’s appeal to the traditional 
institutions and buildings of the Athenian polis shows that his version had a distinctive, 
nostalgic26 focus on Classical Athens. Significantly, he has himself elected strategos, the 
principal office of Pericles and other Classical Athenian leaders.27 
 
Crucially, Posidonius presents Athenion exploiting Classicising ideals, both narrowly 
democratic and more generic ones, to advocate transgression of certain standards apparently of 
great importance for Posidonius and his assumed audience. These include the sanctity of debt 
                                                 
25 For an overview, see Gray 2015: introduction and chapter 1. 
26 The Pnyx, for example, had probably by now largely been superseded by the theatre as the 
location for assemblies. 
27 Manuela Mari pointed this out to me. 
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contracts: Athenion’s letters promise the overturning or artificial settling28 of certain debts, 
possibly public but more likely private, and resulting ὁμόνοια.29 Athenion also subsequently 
rides roughshod over the inviolability of established property rights more generally: on 
becoming tyrant, he confiscates the property of political opponents. Athenion’s calls for 
solidarity and self-government also incite disregard for the principles of ordered, rule-governed 
and trustworthy diplomacy. He urges the Athenians not to acquiesce in Roman order and 
procedures, including the Senate’s reasoned supervision of Athenian affairs. 
 
Posidonius thus offers a satire on a particular type of Classicism: a particular, destabilising way 
of harking back to the more utopian and community-centred elements in Classical civic values 
and practices. His Athenion is a ridiculous and pernicious advocate of a move, conceived as a 
reversion, towards an extreme type of civic self-determination, which can impulsively set aside 
                                                 
28 Kallet-Marx (1995: 207) argues that Posidonius’ Athenion could be taken to be implying 
that Mithridates’ bounty will make possible the settling (rather than overturning) of all debts. 
Even in that case, Mithridates’ intervention would compromise the principle that individuals 
should take responsibility for their own debts and obligations. However, there does, in fact, 
seem to be at least an undertone of threat, directed at the propertied, in Athenion’s remarks. 
29 Posidonius fr. 253, ll. 26–30. The reference to concord adds to the probability that the 
reference to debts is to private debts, binding individuals to fellow Athenians or outsiders, 
probably including Romans. Indeed, the language of civic ὁμόνοια (on which see generally 
Thériault 1996: ch. 1) is very frequently used in Hellenistic honorary decrees for foreign 
judges, to celebrate the resolution of debt disputes between individuals: Dössel 2003: 263–4, 
271–2. Badian (1976: 107–108) thinks that public (state) debts may be in question here, though 
the matter is open. 
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legal contracts and diplomatic agreements in the name of collective freedom, the common 
good, ὁμόνοια, and the defence of civic life, culture and institutions. 
 
The ethical force of Posidonius’ representation of Athenion is best understood in the context 
of Posidonius’ broader ethical philosophy. It is important to make clear that Posidonius was 
not uniformly hostile to all forms of demanding ethics. He held, like all Stoics, that moral virtue 
is the only true good.30 On the other hand, he was perhaps more prepared than many Stoics to 
recognise the force of immediate calculations of expediency as a rival consideration to virtue 
and true reason: unusually for a Stoic, he entertained the possibility of a conflict for an 
individual between what is expedient and what is morally right in a given situation.31  
 
This was partly a reflection of the fact that Posidonius was almost certainly one of those later 
Stoics who took a particular interest in the practical ethical problems, not only of the sage, but 
also of ordinary men (those ‘making progress’ towards virtue) and how to educate and advise 
them.32 The details of his resulting practical ethical teaching are difficult to reconstruct. The 
fragments of his historical writing show that Posidonius was certainly not hostile to all ideals 
of human sympathy and even solidarity: he repeatedly draws attention to the possible adverse 
consequences of brutality towards the less powerful, especially slaves.33  
 
                                                 
30 See, for example, Posidonius T81 and frs. 185–6. 
31 Cic. Off. 3.8 (= Posidonius fr. 41c, section 8), with Kidd (1988–1999), vol. II i), 188–9. 
32 See, for example, Kidd (1988–1999), vol. II ii), 585, with Posidonius frs. 176–7. 
33 See Posidonius fr. 51; compare frs. 59, 262. 
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Nevertheless, the types of fellow-feeling approved by Posidonius were predominantly 
hierarchical and paternalistic. Athenaeus quotes Posidonius commenting, in connection with 
the hierarchical relations between the citizens of Pontic Herakleia and the surrounding non-
Greek population, the Mariandynoi, that many of those who cannot stand up for their interests, 
due to weakness in intellect, call on the help of cleverer superiors, offering other services in 
return.34 In other words, the less intelligent require the sober, reasoned supervision of a more 
intelligent elite, which they can repay with work of their own.35 
 
In light of his paternalistic outlook, it is quite easy to imagine Posidonius being favourable to 
judicious, occasional bending of contracts and rules, for the sake of stability. However, it is 
also easy to see why he would have been opposed to any systematic legal or political changes 
in the name of equality, strong community or collective freedom, of the kind championed by 
his Athenion.  
 
A clue to Posidonius’ approach to the precise ethical character and structure of good social 
relations is Athenaeus’ report of Posidonius’ approving summary of traditional Roman ethics: 
the main personal virtues are frugality and self-restraint, and the key to good social relations is 
justice and scrupulous care not to commit wrong against anyone (δικαιοσύνη δὲ καὶ πολλὴ τοῦ 
                                                 
34 Posidonius fr. 60. Posidonius perhaps advanced this parallel in connection with Attalus III’s 
bequest of his kingdom to the superior power of Rome: K. Dowden in BNJ 87 F8 Commentary. 
35 Compare Kidd (1988–1999), vol II ii), 294–5, 870; Garnsey (1997), esp. 173. Consider also 
Posidonius fr. 284. 
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πλημμελεῖν εὐλάβεια πρὸς πάντας ἀνθρώπους).36 It is difficult to reconstruct how exactly 
Posidonius would have interpreted ‘justice’ and ‘not committing wrong against anyone’. There 
is, however, a very interesting overlap in phrasing and approach with another first-century 
work, Cicero’s De Officiis, which had its own Stoic inspiration.37 It is likely that Posidonius, 
like Cicero,38 regarded a particular type of respect as an especially important component of 
these two values: unbending, unconditional respect for individuals’ legal and contractual 
entitlements, including property rights. It is also likely that, again like Cicero, Posidonius 
would have given great importance under these headings to the precise, ‘just’ requital of goods 
with equivalent goods. Indeed, emphasis on justice and avoidance of harm chimes with the 
‘stress on agreement and contract’,39 as well as strictly equivalent exchange of useful services, 
which marks Posidonius’ treatment of the subordination of the Mariandynoi to the 
Herakleians,40 discussed above. 
 
Significantly, alongside his other ethical concerns, Posidonius appears to have presupposed the 
importance of helping one’s home country, since he compiled a list of extreme cases of actions 
so appalling that a sage would not do them even to save his country.41 He is unlikely, however, 
to have been in sympathy with the kind of extreme, emotional patriotism advocated by his 
                                                 
36 Posidonius fr. 266. Compare Posidonius fr. 273; see also Posidonius frs. 58–9, 63, 77, for 
criticism of over-indulgence. 
37 Compare Cic. Off., esp. 1.20, 31. 
38 See Long 1995; compare section 3 below. 
39 Kidd 1988–1999): vol. II ii), 297. 
40 Posidonius fr. 60. 
41 Posidonius fr. 177. 
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Athenion: warm, nostalgic, community-centred ideals have to be kept within the limits of 
property rights, proportionality and protocol.  
 
In the remainder of this chapter, I argue that Posidonius’ approach to Athenion can be seen as 
a contribution to important later Hellenistic debates. The central point of controversy in those 
debates was whether property rights, financial contracts and other formal agreements are 
unconditionally inviolable, or whether they should sometimes be set aside for the sake of other 
values with at least an equally strong Classical pedigree, such as equality, freedom, virtue, 
tradition or solidarity. These debates must have been a response to the probable Roman-backed 
changes in culture and ethics, as well as law and institutions, which gave expanded freedoms 
and privileges to elite citizens, property-owners and creditors in the later Hellenistic 
Mediterranean.42 As will be seen, supporters of the first alternative tended to criticise certain 
Classical Athenian ideals, while their opponents championed particular Classical Athenian 
traditions. However, it is important to emphasise that each side in these debates was selective 
among Classical Athenian political ideals, singling out particular values for attack or 
emulation; neither side’s position rested on a comprehensive picture of Classical Athenian 
political thinking, and both downplayed the already strong Classical tendency to understand 
the polis in contractual terms. 
                                                 
42 These changes are emphasised by de Ste Croix and others in the Marxist tradition (see, for 
example, Briscoe 1967; de Ste Croix 1981: 300–326), but also acknowledged by others. See, 
for example, Bowersock 1966: 6–7, Gauthier 1985 and Fröhlich and Müller 2005 on the polis, 
with the specific case-studies in Grieb 2008: 196–8 (Cos) and 260–1 (Miletus). Kallet-Marx 
(1995: 71–2) sounds a sceptical note about any Roman suppression of Greek democracy and 
egalitarianism, emphasising long-term internal Greek shifts. 
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8.3 A Broader Later Hellenistic Reaction against Certain Classical Athenian Civic Ideals? 
 
Political attitudes and targets similar to Posidonius’ are more directly attested for some other 
mid- and later Hellenistic intellectuals favourable to Rome: there was a broad reaction in some 
quarters against certain traditional Greek, and Athenian, ideals of civic community, which 
relevant intellectuals attacked as an explicit foil. The most obvious comparison is with 
Posidonius’ fellow mid- and later Hellenistic Stoics. Although it remains a controversial 
interpretation, there are strong grounds for believing that certain mid- and later Hellenistic 
Stoics made important adaptations to Stoic practical ethics. According to this highly plausible 
view, some Stoics of that era reacted against the more egalitarian and community-centred 
elements of Greek and Stoic political thought, including their Classical Athenian forms. In 
doing so, they strongly advocated the revision, devaluation or supersession of those ideals in 
favour of principles giving special moral weight to the rule of law, contracts and property 
rights; strict reciprocity and earned individual entitlements; and regulated, enlightened 
egoism.43 
 
The cornerstone of this contested interpretation of some mid- and later Hellenistic Stoics’ ethics 
and politics is Cicero’s De Officiis. In that work, Cicero stresses the importance of good faith 
                                                 
43 See Erskine 2011: esp. chs. 5 and 6; Long 1997. Contrast Brunt 2013. 
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or fides as a central aspect of justice and virtue. A.A. Long argues44 provocatively but 
effectively that Cicero is here principally interested in the kind of fides involved in scrupulously 
respecting property rights and financial contracts, if necessary at the expense of other values.45 
It is important to note that Cicero also uses much rhetoric about the common good and 
solidarity in the De Officiis. However, those notions are often pegged very closely to the 
upholding of property rights, strict entitlements and the existing social order,46 and to strict 
reciprocity, rather than unconditional generosity.47 As Long puts it, human solidarity, for all 
Cicero’s praise of it, is made ‘to consist primarily in respecting strict justice about property 
rights and business transactions’.48   
 
The reason why Cicero’s De Officiis indicates that a similar approach was prominent within 
contemporary Stoicism is that Cicero’s work was very deeply indebted to the On Duty of the 
leading second-century Stoic Panaetius of Rhodes. If the De Officiis was not quite a quasi-
translation of that work,49 it was a faithful but imaginative Roman interpretation of it. A 
particular reason for believing that the inspiration for Cicero’s approach to fides in that work 
came partly from one strand in contemporary Stoic thought50 is Cicero’s own presentation of 
                                                 
44 Long 1995. 
45 Note, in particular, Cic. Off. 1.23: fundamentum autem est iustitiae fides, id est dictorum 
conventorumque constantia et veritas. 
46 See Cic. Off. 1.20; 2.85. 
47 See Cic. Off. 1.20, 22. 
48 Long 1995: 239. 
49 See Brunt 2013: ch. 5.  
50 Compare Erskine 2011: 156.  
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aspects of mid- and later Hellenistic Stoic ethics in Book III. Cicero there presents Panaetius’ 
mentor, the second-century Stoic Diogenes of Babylon, arguing that the just man is morally51 
obliged only to respect the letter of his legal and contractual obligations. A just trader, for 
example, has no moral obligation to reveal that goods he is selling are faulty.52 
 
Moreover, Cicero presents the later Stoic Hecato of Rhodes, like Posidonius a pupil of 
Panaetius, drawing out the egoistic implications of this approach to ethics. Cicero quotes 
Hecato arguing that it is characteristic of the wise man, the Stoic sage, that he pursues the 
private interests of his family estate, within the constraints of custom and law. This is because 
the welfare of a city is, in fact, dependent on its individual members maximising, rather than 
sacrificing, their personal fortunes.53 It is very likely that Hecato was here reacting against 
prominent Greek ideas about the primacy of the common good over private interests. His aim 
must have been to redefine the common good, in order to accommodate, and even celebrate, 
more egoistic impulses.54 
 
This contract-focussed, quite egoist strand in Stoic practical ethics was certainly not 
unquestioned within the Stoa: indeed, Cicero presents Diogenes of Babylon engaged in a 
vigorous debate with his fellow Stoic Antipater of Tarsus, who insists on the importance of far 
                                                 
51 Contrast Annas 1997: esp. 158–60, criticised in Schofield 1999a: ch. 9. 
52 See Cic. Off. 3.50–7, 91–2. 
53 Cic. Off. 3.63. 
54 Schofield (1999: 175–6) compares Hecato with Adam Smith in this respect; compare Erskine 
2011: ch. 5. 
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more robust ties of solidarity among all humans.55 However, Cicero’s evidence suggests that 
this new strand in the Stoa was a prominent and widespread one. It is likely that Posidonius 
shared with Diogenes of Babylon and Hecato of Rhodes, and probably also Panaetius, 
scepticism about any high-blown rhetoric about community, virtue and the common good 
which might substantially curtail individual freedom in using and preserving private wealth. 
 
In this respect, relevant Stoics were in agreement with a prominent Roman line of thinking, 
represented by Cicero, which was instinctively suspicious of ambitious social projects, 
including Classical Athenian ones.56 Cicero in the De Re Publica disparaged Greek ambitious, 
utopian theories of civic education; in the De Officiis, while he praised Peripatetic and 
Academic ideas highly, he announced that on the particular issue of duty (officium) he was 
minded to follow the Stoics,57 who gave him a template for the picture of duty, partly centred 
on contractual fides, which he developed in that work. This is certainly not to deny that other 
Romans were attracted to more utopian and community-centred types of politics: there was 
rich diversity in Roman political thinking, as in Greek.58 
 
                                                 
55 Cic. Off. 3.50–7. 
56 For Cicero’s De Re Publica as a non-utopian adaptation of Greek paradigms, compare Asmis 
2004: 590–1 (the good res publica as a ‘partnership’). On the complex, difficult relationship 
between Roman political thinking and Greek ethics and utopianism more generally, compare 
Griffin and Barnes (1997); Gotter (2003). 
57 Cic. Rep. 4.3; Off. 1.2, 6. 
58 Compare Arena 2012. 
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Significantly for the concerns of this volume, the community-centred approaches of which 
relevant Greek Stoics themselves were suspicious would also have included much Classical 
Athenian ethical and political rhetoric, democratic and philosophical. Indeed, they would have 
included early Stoic political thought, especially Zeno’s Republic,59 which had arisen in the 
context of later Classical and early Hellenistic Athenian political and philosophical debates.60 
For example, Long’s chapter in this volume brings out the utopian and anti-conventional 
character of Zeno’s political thought, quite different from the strands of later Stoic political 
thinking emphasised here. 
 
While Posidonius shared the approach under discussion here with some fellow Stoics, his 
relevant attitudes and aversions overlapped most closely with those of another intellectual, 
Polybius, Posidonius’ forerunner as historian. Like Posidonius, Polybius shows strong hostility 
to certain types of Classical Athenian civic ideal, both democratic and more generic. Indeed, 
Posidonius’ account of Athenion recalls Polybius’ well-known hostility to radical democracy 
and popular agitation, both in theory and in practice. As Champion shows in this volume, an 
integral feature of Polybius’ development of his sceptical position towards radical democracy 
was criticism of Classical Athenian internal politics.61  
                                                 
59 For the probable wider phenomenon of later Stoics reacting against earlier Stoic views 
betraying Cynic influence: Brouwer 2002: 202–203; Bees 2011: 34–6, both citing earlier 
bibliography. The Athenian honorary decree for Zeno quoted in Diogenes Laertius was 
probably forged in the first century BC (Haake 2013: 99–100), perhaps in the context of these 
debates. 
60 See recently Murray 2005; Bees 2011; Richter 2011: ch. 2.  
61 See also recently Grieb 2013. 
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Polybius was striving to display to Roman readers, and also to some Greeks, a reassuringly 
conservative approach to politics and property rights. This too chimes with Posidonius. Indeed, 
there are echoes in Posidonius’ excoriation of Athenion’s approach to finance of Polybius’ 
regular hostility to calls for debt reform or overturning of debts in different parts of the Greek 
world, including by alleged tyrants or aspirants to tyranny.62 A further shared symptom of this 
conservative approach was resentment of emotional and emotive rhetoric, which carried the 
threat of demagoguery. In the same way as Posidonius mercilessly satirised Athenion’s 
rhetoric, Polybius heavily criticised excessively emotional or flamboyant rhetoric both in 
political speeches63 and in works of history.64   
 
In addition to an aversion to Classical Athenian radical democracy, Polybius also shared with 
Posidonius an aversion to some more generic Classical Athenian civic ideals, of philosophical, 
utopian and community-oriented types.65 For example, Polybius was openly sceptical about 
the law-code drawn up by the Peripatetic Prytanis of Karystos for Polybius’ home city, 
Megalopolis, in 222 BC, exposing it as a source of discord rather than stability.66 Polybius’ 
scepticism about this Peripatetic philosopher’s laws probably had deeper intellectual roots. 
Lintott, Hahm and others have emphasised the distinctiveness of Polybius’ vision of a 
                                                 
62 See, for example, Polyb. 15.21.3–5; 20.6.3–6, 7.4; cf. Ferrary 1988: 489–90; Eckstein 1995: 
133–5; Champion 2007. 
63 Consider, for example, Polyb. 38.12. 
64 See Polyb. 2.56; 12.26d. Compare recently Marincola 2013; Thornton 2013b. 
65 Gray 2013b. 
66 Polyb. 5.93. 
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constitution combining elements of different constitutions (democracy, aristocracy, monarchy) 
in Book VI. Whereas earlier thinkers, including Plato and Aristotle, advocated a genuinely 
‘mixed constitution’, a harmonious blend of contrasting citizens and institutions, Polybius 
reacted against earlier Greek approaches by favouring a dynamic, conflictual system. He 
advocated complex interaction, competition and bargaining, involving the possibility of both 
co-operation and antagonism, between contrasting citizens and institutions, regulated by 
institutional checks and balances, on the Roman model.67 
 
Moreover, Polybius praises his home state, the second-century Achaian League, in a way which 
probably reveals self-conscious opposition to Aristotelian and Peripatetic demanding ideals of 
civic community. Polybius insists that the second-century Achaian League was simultaneously 
both a military alliance of states and very nearly an almost pan-Peloponnesian polis: only the 
lack of a circuit wall stood between it and qualification as a polis.68 With this claim, he shatters 
the famous Aristotelian qualitative distinction between an alliance, which exists for the sake of 
mutual utility and mere life, and a true polis, which exists for the sake of the good life and 
virtue for all.69 In Polybius’ view, there was no sharp qualitative distinction in the Achaian 
case: the League came to resemble a very large polis by expanding upon, rather than 
abandoning or transforming, the institutions and customs characteristic of a military alliance. 
 
                                                 
67 On the differences between Polybius’ and earlier approaches, see Lintott 1997: 78–9; Hahm 
2009: 193–6; Gray 2013b: 339–40, 352–3. 
68 Polyb. 2.37.7–11. 
69 Arist. Pol. 1280a34–1280b35. 
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The likelihood that Polybius was here directly taking issue with Peripatetic thought is greatly 
increased by the fact that, as scholars since von Scala have noted, he makes probable hostile 
allusions to the ideas in two passages of Aristotle’s Politics, which, significantly, both concern 
Polybius’ beloved Peloponnese.70 First, Aristotle had claimed that there are limits to the 
possible size of a true polis; putting a wall around the Peloponnese would not make it a polis.71 
It is hard not to take Polybius’ claim that a wall would have made the Achaian League an 
almost pan-Peloponnesian polis as a riposte to Aristotle’s studied localism. Second, Polybius’ 
theme of the relationship between a military alliance and a polis recalls a difficult Aristotelian 
passage, whose interpretation is contested, in which Aristotle discusses the relationship 
between polis, ‘tribe’ (ἔθνος) and military alliance. Aristotle probably there uses the Arcadians, 
Polybius’ own ἔθνος, as an example of a federalised tribe which lacks the complex type of 
social integration characteristic of a true polis, because it remains fundamentally a prudential 
(military) alliance.72 
 
Whether or not Aristotle intended to belittle the Arcadians and their style of federalism in that 
latter passage, it is probable that Polybius interpreted him or a Peripatetic successor as having 
done so. Indeed, Polybius’ praise of the Achaian League as virtually a pan-Peloponnesian polis, 
based on principles of democratic equality, is a Peloponnesian, indeed Arcadian, riposte to any 
                                                 
70 See von Scala 1890: 134; Lehmann 2001: 58–60; also Gray 2013b: 338–41.  
71 Arist. Pol. 1276a24–7. 
72 Arist. Pol. 1261a22–9. Compare the interpretations of this passage advanced by Schütrumpf 
1991–2005: Teil II, 164–6 and Lehmann 2001: 35–7; contrast Saunders 1995: 109 and Hansen 
1999: 80–4. 
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Athenian or Peripatetic condescension or disdain concerning the political credentials and moral 
standing of Peloponnesian supra-polis institutions. 
 
These different elements of Polybius’ political thought made him an advocate of an ideal of 
what might be called a ‘limited’ polis, bound more by constitution and law than by far-reaching 
virtue and education. This approach certainly had Greek antecedents,73 but it was more 
consistent with certain Roman ideas74 than with much mainstream political thought in the 
Greek philosophical tradition.75 A true, admirable polis need not be a very close-knit 
community committed to shared ideals of virtue, as in the Aristotelian ideal. Rather, it may be 
simply a very complex alliance or social contract of individual people and groups, each 
principally seeking their own interests within its formal constraints. Within a ‘limited’ polis of 
this type, marked by a significant degree of egoism and antagonism, the inviolability of 
property rights, contracts and law, on which Polybius elsewhere insists so vehemently, takes 
on particular importance: it is both a constraint against excessive self-seeking and a defence of 
individuals’ private interests. 
 
Significantly, Polybius even attempts, like the Stoic Hecato of Rhodes, to appropriate major 
value terms, such as virtue and the common good, for his own, more contractual political ideal. 
In his praise of the Achaian League, Polybius polemically insists that one could not find a purer 
system of true democracy, equality and freedom of speech than the Achaian League.76 This is 
                                                 
73 See Gray 2015: ch. 1 and passim, on Greek ‘Dikaiopolitan’ approaches. 
74 E.g. those studied in Asmis 2004. 
75 Gray 2013b develops this case. 
76 Polyb. 2.38.6; see also Champion’s chapter here.  
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an obvious challenge to the truly democratic character of the Classical Athenian democracy, 
distinguished by more far-reaching political equality among all socio-economic citizen groups, 
a far higher level of direct popular sovereignty, and a stronger ethos of solidarity. For Polybius, 
such features hindered, rather than promoting, (‘true’) democracy, equality and freedom, 
whether in Classical Athens or in contemporary Greece.77 Polybius’ work thus reveals, but also 
plays on, the ambivalence in Hellenistic thought, explored elsewhere in this volume,78 
concerning whether demokratia denotes popular, non-oligarchic government or, more blandly, 
any form of republican government.79 
 
To sum up, there are important similarities between Posidonius, some fellow Stoics and 
Polybius: all shared a strong aversion to certain, more utopian and community-centred 
Classical Athenian civic ideals, also evident slightly later in Strabo’s professed approach to 
political theorising.80 For all these thinkers, a more contractual model of political life held the 
attraction over visceral, particularist patriotism that it could be extended across a much broader 
scale, whether a federal league or the whole Romanising Mediterranean cosmopolis. There 
were also important differences between these thinkers, especially between the contractarian 
Polybius and relevant Stoics, who continued to believe that moral and political values are 
grounded in nature. This meta-ethical disagreement need not, however, obscure convergences 
                                                 
77 Compare Polybius’ criticism of developments at Cius at 15.21; also Champion (2004b). 
78 See, for example, Canevaro’s and Champion’s chapters. 
79 Compare Musti 1978: 127–8; contrast Kallet-Marx 1995: e.g. 207–208, who thinks that the 
word had in general lost its radical connotations.  
80 See Strabo 1.1.18, implicitly siding with Plato’s Thrasymachos over more community-
centred approaches. 
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in practical ethical and political thinking. Indeed, Posidonius’ discussion of the mutual 
agreement between the Herakleians and Mariandynoi, discussed above, is almost an application 
of Polybius’ model of hierarchical contractarianism among primitive men:81 both models 
involve the consent of the weaker in rule by their more intelligent superiors. In this respect, 
these thinkers were developing certain distinctive earlier Greek ideas,82 fusing them with 
Roman ones, but they were also moving very far from their explicit foil: prominent Classical 
Athenian ideals of solidarity, which made a respectable polis something much more than a 
social contract. 
 
8.4 Traces of Later Hellenistic Advocacy of Classical Athenian Civic Ideals, beyond 
Posidonius’ Athenion 
 
There are, therefore, good reasons for thinking that Posidonius’ stress on almost unconditional 
property rights and aversion to Classicising utopian rhetoric about civic community chimed 
with the approaches of some contemporary Greek intellectuals, as well as those of prominent 
Romans. This raises the question of these Greek intellectuals’ precise motivations and targets. 
Were they attacking a straw man, or, at least, a political position which had long ceased to be 
prevalent in the Greek world, in order to ingratiate themselves with prominent Romans? Or 
were they, on the contrary, reacting against a live, vibrant strand of contemporary thinking? In 
this section, I identify traces in the surviving sources of the ideas and rhetoric of an opposing 
camp: articulate, uncompromising exponents of varied ideals of strong civic community. These 
Greeks challenged any suggestion that property rights or diplomatic protocol should 
                                                 
81 Polyb. 6.6.4–6.7.5; compare Hahm 1995; Griffin 1996: 271; Champion 2004a: 88. 
82 See Gray 2015: ch. 1 and passim (‘Dikaiopolitan’ values). 
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automatically take precedence over equality, solidarity and collective freedom. On the 
contrary, they should sometimes be sacrificed or adapted in accordance with the demands of 
those other ideals. Moreover, many relevant mid- and later Hellenistic Greeks drew on 
Classical models to reinforce their case. 
 
It is important to make clear that the traces in question are fleeting ones. Relevant Greeks were 
on the losing side in heated political and cultural debates. Their opponents, both leading 
Romans and stauncher defenders of the Roman order among Greeks, had many opportunities 
to belittle and marginalise relevant ideas, and even remove or dilute the evidence that others 
advocated them. Nevertheless, if the different types of evidence for later Hellenistic political 
and ethical thought are analysed with a willingness to detect the weaker voices of the less 
powerful and less conventional, traces of eccentric and radical ways of thinking emerge.83 
 
8.4.1 Self-confident Later Hellenistic Democrats? 
 
Posidonius’ Athenion’s speech is one of the only traces of radically democratic rhetoric in later 
Hellenistic Athens itself. However, evidence from other parts of the Greek world contains 
traces of democratic self-confidence. The still rich epigraphic record shows that traditional 
participatory democratic institutions and practices, partly Athenian-inspired,84 were under 
some threat, from long-term trends and Roman influence, but certainly continued to function.85 
In most cities the demos still retained a strong voice and significant institutional power, 
                                                 
83 Compare Arena 2012, on the Roman Republic. 
84 See the introduction to this volume and Canevaro’s chapter. 
85 For an overview of the complex picture: Fröhlich and Müller 2005. 
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advertised in public inscriptions. The demos’ power was exercised not least in assigning 
coveted honours to elite benefactors, through a complex negotiation.86 This negotiation gave 
rise to formal honorary decrees passed and inscribed in poleis in honour of leading civic 
benefactors.87 Since all such decrees would have been ratified by a vote in the assembly, after 
speeches and probably also discussion, there would have been scope for both elite, well-
educated citizens and other members of the demos to influence their content. 
 
Surviving decrees preserve some indications that still functioning democratic institutions were 
underpinned by explicit, self-conscious democratic thinking. In the second-century BC, for 
example, the demos of Kyme in Western Asia Minor awarded an honorary statue to the leading 
female citizen Archippe. In a display of continuing democratic self-confidence, Archippe’s 
statue was to be crowned by a colossal statue of the Demos itself.88  
 
There are even some traces of later Hellenistic democrats asserting the importance of popular 
sovereignty, equality and solidarity, even to the extent of questioning the privileges of elite 
citizens, property-holders and creditors. As Hamon has argued,89 a trace of strikingly 
egalitarian principle is preserved in the middle of a varied later Hellenistic honorary decree for 
a benefactor, the decree of Pergamon for the gymnasiarch Metrodoros. As well as praising his 
general virtues and imaginative contributions to the gymnasium and festivals, the Pergamenes 
                                                 
86 Ma 2013, esp. ch. 2. 
87 On such decrees and their rhetoric in general, see in particular Gauthier 1985; Wörrle 1995; 
Robert and Robert 1989; Quaß 1993; Robert 2007: ch. 21. 
88 SEG 33.1035, ll. 1–3, with Ma 2013: 47 on the wider phenomenon. 
89 See Hamon 2012: 62–4. 
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praised Metrodoros for organising and leading parades of the young men of the gymnasium, 
on his own initiative, at a wide range of citizen funerals, such that ‘the thoroughly common 
people were no less honoured in this respect than those in superior positions’ ([τ]ο̣ὺς πανὺ 
δημοτικοὺς μηδὲν ἧσσον τῶν ἐν ὑπεροχῆι ὄντων ἐν τῶι μέρει τούτωι τιμᾶσθαι).90  He thus 
ensured that a grand funeral, with a quasi-official parade, usually a privilege for elite 
benefactors, was available to citizens from all parts of the social scale, including the lowest. 
 
It is difficult to determine the exact political force of this claim. It must be significant that the 
decree dates to the period shortly after the tumultuous end of the Attalid monarchy in 133 BC, 
when Aristonikos had led an anti-Roman revolt in Asia Minor which probably had at least 
some populist colouring, as well as popular support from the poor and even the unfree.91 
Metrodoros’ behaviour, and the praise for it before the Pergamene assembly, could be 
interpreted solely as parts of a paternalistic attempt by an anxious elite to soothe popular 
discontent and resentment of elite privileges. It is true that neither Metrodoros’ actions nor 
subsequent praise for them overturned rigid status distinctions: they showed, rather, that those 
status distinctions could be set aside or concealed in a specific context. In this respect, this 
clause in the Metrodoros decree bears some comparison with the claim in a later Hellenistic 
decree of the city of Priene, also in Western Asia Minor, that a great benefactor invited slaves 
and foreigners to a breakfast, on equal terms with citizens, temporarily rendering insignificant 
the chance misfortune (τύχη) of slaves and the standing of foreigners.92 Indeed, Metrodoros 
                                                 
90 H. Hepding, MDAI (A) 1907, 274–6, no. 10, ll. 19–23. 
91 See Strabo 14.1.38; Diod. Sic. 34/35.2.26. 
92 I.Priene2 69 (new edition of I.Priene 113), ll. 53–6; compare Hamon 2012: 70–1. 
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might be seen to emerge from the Pergamene decree as a paternalistic, quasi-monarchical 
patron of equality and solidarity, standing above the community.93 
 
However, even if elite Pergamenes were motivated principally by a desire to disarm popular 
disaffection, they must at least have expected there to be self-confident egalitarians among the 
Pergamene people, to whom such rhetoric would appeal. Moreover, it is not necessary to be 
entirely cynical about the motivations of Metrodoros and his supporters themselves. Granting 
ordinary citizens a quasi-honorific funeral was a far more substantial challenge to the existing 
distribution of honour and privilege than merely inviting unfortunate neighbours to a special 
meal, clearly as guests rather than truly equal partners, as at Priene. Indeed, Metrodoros’ 
actions went a long way towards setting poorer citizen families in a position of genuine honour, 
in a crucial, conspicuous and clearly political context. Since it was a matter of equality among 
citizens in access to a key symbol of civic honour and belonging, the value in question was 
quite different from the more general equality of all city-residents in access to less directly 
political goods, including medical care as well as hospitality, celebrated in other later 
Hellenistic decrees.94 At these Pergamene funerals, and in passing this decree, the Pergamene 
elite and demos came together in support of quite a robust, political form of egalitarianism – 
what the young men in Metrodoros’ charge celebrated as his ἰσότης.95 
 
                                                 
93 Hamon 2012: 64. 
94 For a doctor’s universal equality to all residents, see IG V 1 1145 (Gytheion, first century 
BC), ll. 18–20. 
95 H. Hepding, MDAI (A) 1907, 274–6, no. 10, ll. 40–2, 47–9. 
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There are traces in other evidence of strong democratic self-confidence in mid- and later 
Hellenistic Asia Minor. In his Pro Flacco of 59 BC, Cicero attempted to discredit the cities of 
Asia Minor, including Pergamon itself, by describing them as governed by unpredictable and 
seditious assemblies, dominated by manual workers and other unreliable types. Classical 
Athens fell as a result of the immoderate freedom of its assemblies, so what hope is there that 
the assemblies of Phrygia and Mysia will show any restraint?96 Similarly, Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus castigated the shamelessness and demagoguery which he held to be 
characteristic of Asianic oratory, which had colonised the cities of Asia.97 The Metrodoros 
decree indicates that democratic self-confidence in the cities of Asia Minor, which was clearly 
sufficient to alienate conservative Romans and pro-Roman Greeks, could have stronger roots 
in egalitarian principle than Cicero and Dionysius themselves allow. 
 
Self-confident mid- and later Hellenistic democrats could also mount opposition to contested 
debt contracts. One piece of evidence, from the second-century Peloponnese, gives insights 
into the kinds of opposition to which Polybius, in particular, was reacting. This evidence comes 
in the form of the words of a Roman official, in the famous letter of Q. Fabius Maximus 
Servilianus to the Dymaians of Achaia in the later 140s BC.98 The letter contributes to restoring 
the status quo in Dyme after a period of unrest, in which a faction around a man called Sosos 
had overturned the new order established by the Romans after their defeat of the Achaian 
                                                 
96 de Ste Croix 1981: 310. See especially Cic. Flac. 16–17; cf. 57 (mentioning Tralles’ 
assembly as well as Pergamon’s). 
97 Dion. Hal. On the Ancient Orators, preface. 
98 RGDE 246; see in general Ferrary 1988: 186–99; Kallet-Marx 1995: 72–3. 
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League in 146 BC. That new order had included a political system, probably partly new99 and 
more oligarchic than that in place previously,100 for the Achaians, in their individual cities and 
probably also, maybe after a delay, in a reformed Achaian League.101 
 
The opposition of Sosos and those around him to this new order was partly destructive: they 
had destroyed official civic records, leading to a situation of ‘non-fulfilment of contracts’ 
(ἀσυναλλαξία). In a touch strongly reminiscent of some of the pro-Roman, contract-centred 
rhetoric and re-evaluation of moral concepts discussed in the previous section, the contract-
destroying revolt is said to have undermined the ‘freedom’ (ἐλευθερία) brought by the Romans 
to the Greeks. 
 
                                                 
99 Although the Dyme text refers to a restored (ἀποδοθείση) πολιτεία (ll. 9–10), consider Polyb. 
39.5.2–3: Polybius helped the Achaians to get used to the πολιτεία ‘given’ (δεδομένη) by the 
Romans. Polybius’ language implies that the constitution imposed by the Romans had some 
new features. For discussion see Ferrary 1988: 191–4 
100 Paus. 7.16.9 suggests that L. Mummius appointed magistrates in Achaia according to a 
property qualification after 146 BC, which might well indicate that he established new, more 
oligarchic rules concerning eligibility for magistracies (compare Ferrary 1988: 192–4; but note 
the scepticism of Kallet-Marx (1995), 66–70). 
101 Paus. 7.16.9–10 suggests that Mummius initially abolished Greek federal συνέδρια, but 
restored them not long afterwards. Other evidence relevant to the debate about whether changes 
in individual cities and at the federal level were linked: Paus. 8.30.9 credits Polybius with 
establishing ‘constitutions’ in the plural; contrast the use of the singular in the Dyme inscription 
and Polyb. 39.5.2–3 (see previous notes). 
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Although Sosos’ revolt was at least partly a revolt against financial agreements, almost 
certainly including debt contracts, it also had more constructive aspects: Sosos had proposed 
new laws, which are said to have been contrary to the new Roman-backed laws imposed after 
146. It is impossible to be certain what these new laws entailed, though their association with 
overturning of contracts and their provocation of firm Roman opposition lend support to the 
view that they had egalitarian or populist aspects.102 Later Hellenistic Greeks were certainly 
capable of formulating public principled arguments for the relaxation of debt contracts, based 
on considerations of common welfare. For example, in first-century BC Tenos, the demos 
praised a Roman creditor, L. Aufidius Bassus, for being lenient with the polis about repayment 
of debts, judging that, ‘for himself, the salvation of the polis and good repute among all were 
greater than all wealth’ (εἶναί θ’ ἑαυτ[ῶι] πλούτου παντὸς κρείττονα πόλεως σωτηρίαν καὶ τὴν 
π[αρὰ] πᾶσιν ἀγαθὴν εὐφημίαν). They subsequently praised him for using the key democratic 
virtue of frank speech (parrhesia) to convince those putting pressure on the Tenians (τοὺς 
ἐπιβαροῦντας), probably including other creditors,103 to desist.104 Like a good Classical 
Athenian democrat, he used parrhesia to stand up to the stronger, on behalf of the weaker party.  
 
These traces of evidence for later Hellenistic democrats’ opposition to the entrenchment of 
creditors’ power and freedoms suggest that the debt revolts regularly condemned by Polybius 
                                                 
102 Compare Ferrary 1988: 198–9; Thornton 2001a: Part I, ch. 3; contrast Kallet-Marx 1995: 
72–3. 
103 For ἐπιβαρέω used to refer to indebtedness, compare the same inscription, IG XII 5 860 
(Migeotte Emprunt no. 64), ll. 9–10; cf. 31–2. 
104 IG XII 5 860, ll. 37–9, 49–52; compare the earlier attitude attributed to his father in ll. 10–
12. 
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probably sometimes had a more systematic ideological basis than Polybius allows. Relevant 
socio-economic tensions, and associated popular agitation, almost certainly endured into the 
first century AD in some cities.105 Later Hellenistic and early Imperial popular agitation in 
Greek cities was probably also sometimes entangled, as in Posidonius’ picture of Athenion’s 
Athens, with resistance to external interference, including Roman control, on the grounds of 
civic self-determination.106 
 
It is not clear to what extent mid- and later Hellenistic democrats were consciously influenced 
by the Classical Athenian democracy, though it clearly was an obvious parallel for their 
opponents, including Cicero as well as Posidonius and Polybius. Athenian influence is not 
unambiguous in the examples considered in this section, though the Metrodoros decree does 
give pause for thought: the emphasis on egalitarian funeral arrangements for all citizens recalls 
the distinctive practices and ideology of Athenian public funerals and funeral orations, surely 
well-known in the Hellenistic world through the evidence of Thucydides and the Attic orators. 
The probability of a link is increased by the fact that other aspects of Hellenistic Pergamon’s 
civic life were self-consciously modelled on the Classical Athenian democracy.107 
 
 
 
                                                 
105 On the Greek cities of the early Imperial period, compare Ma 2000; Thornton 2001b, 2008 
(reconstructing the stasis which led to the provincialisation of Lycia, SEG 51.1832, A, ll. 16–
30). 
106 Compare Thornton 1999, 2001b, 2008. 
107 See recently Thonemann 2013b, on the astynomoi law. 
35 
 
 
8.4.2 Traces of Later Hellenistic Assertion of Certain Classical Athenian Philosophical 
Ideals of Strong Civic Community 
 
The Role of the Hellenistic Peripatetics 
 
Even though explicit appeals to Classical Athenian democratic ideals are not widely attested, 
there is more evidence for later Hellenistic Greeks making direct appeals to broader Classical 
Athenian civic ideals, sometimes drawing on Classical Athenian philosophical models and 
doctrines. The argument of this section is that certain followers of Aristotle, and sometimes 
Plato, were at the forefront of these moves. Aristotle himself was obviously not connected 
solely with Classical Athens, though he did spend most of his working life there, but also with 
many other parts of the fourth-century world. Nonetheless, he was closely associated with 
Classical Athens by at least some Hellenistic Greeks: there is a Hellenistic forged Classical 
Athenian honorary decree for him.108 Moreover, his school, the Lyceum, was more 
unequivocally rooted in Classical Athens. 
 
The best evidence for later Hellenistic Peripatetic philosophers’ approaches to practical ethical 
and political issues109 is the first-century BC summary of Peripatetic ethics preserved in 
Stobaeus, traditionally attributed to the late Hellenistic philosopher Arius Didymus, who 
                                                 
108 Haake 2013: 94–6; see also below. 
109 For a broader survey of Peripatetic ethics, especially meta-ethics, see Inwood 2014. 
36 
 
flourished in the Augustan period.110 That summary includes quite surprisingly cosmopolitan 
or universalist aspects, which suggest the influence of Stoic thought on Peripatetic ethics, also 
evident in other sources.111 However, it also includes strong emphasis on more traditional 
Peripatetic concerns, especially the importance of close-knit human communities, including 
close-knit poleis.  
 
Stress is laid on the traditional Peripatetic insistence on the social and political nature of all 
humans: ‘a human being is a co-operative and communal animal’ (φιλάλληλον γὰρ εἶναι καὶ 
κοινωνικὸν ζῷον τὸν ἄνθρωπον), in relations with family, fellow citizens and broader groups. 
This is because good relations with others are intrinsically choiceworthy: affection among 
humans ‘is choiceworthy on its own account (δι’ αὑτὴν αἱρετὴν) and not only because of its 
usefulness (μὴ μόνον διὰ χρείας).’112 
 
The summary also expands on the practical consequences of basic Peripatetic ideas about 
human nature and relationships. The summariser claims that, since virtue makes a greater 
contribution to happiness than bodily or external goods, ‘benefaction (εὐεργεσία) will be 
established and gratitude (χάρις) and favour (εὐχαριστία) and humanity (φιλανθρωπία) and 
love of children and of brothers, and in addition to these love of country and of one’s father 
and one’s relations and, in accordance with proper function, readiness to share and goodwill 
                                                 
110 On this work, see recently Sharples 2010: text 15A, with commentary; Inwood 2014: 77–
88. 
111 See Annas 1995; Inwood 2014: 55, 83–8. 
112 Sharples 2010: text 15A, section 4; the translations from this text in this chapter are those 
of Sharples, sometimes adapted. 
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and friendship and fairness and justice (ἥ τ’ εὐκοινωνησία καὶ ἡ εὔνοια, καὶ ἡ φιλία, καὶ ἡ 
ἰσότης καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη) and the whole divine chorus of the virtues’.113 The reference to 
εὐκοινωνησία (‘readiness to share’, ‘good fellowship’ or ‘community spirit’), a rare word 
scarcely114 attested in surviving Greek literature outside Stobaeus, immediately suggests that 
these types of benevolence and affection rely on very robust ideas of mutuality and community: 
it is important to share goods out of pure public-spiritedness, rather than merely observe 
contracts and strict entitlements. In Stobaeus’ summary, an inference is drawn from this about 
the moral status of external goods, including wealth, office and capacities: they are good only 
in so far as the good man makes proper use of them (ἀφώρισται τὸ εἶναι ἀγαθὰ τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ 
ἀνδρὸς χρήσει).115  
 
One section of the Stobaean summary indicates particularly clearly that Hellenistic Peripatetics 
reflected about the relationship between justice, solidarity and contracts: at what price should 
contracts be observed? In chapter 43, the summariser attributes to the Peripatetics a 
distinctively social, community-centred view of justice. For the Peripatetics, justice is a 
complex virtue, which involves ‘piety (εὐσεβεία), holiness (ὁσιότης), goodness (χρηστότης), 
community spirit (εὐκοινωνησία) and fair dealing (εὐσυναλλαξία)’. Peripatetic justice is thus 
not merely a question of giving fair shares: it also involves ‘goodness’, subsequently defined 
as ‘a disposition which does good to people voluntarily for their own sake’.  
 
                                                 
113 Sharples 2010: text 15A, section 12. 
114 But see Marcus Aurelius Ta eis heauton 11.20. 
115 Sharples 2010: text 15A, section 23. This was, in fact, a disputed question within the later 
Hellenistic Peripatos: Inwood (2014), 54–65.  
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Particularly relevant among the facets of justice listed is ‘fair dealing’ (εὐσυναλλαξία). Its 
presence in the list shows that the Peripatetics were keen to lay claim to respect for contracts 
as part of their ethical system. They were, however, also wary of excessive punctiliousness. 
They defined true ‘fair dealing’ as a mean between two extremes: at one extreme lies lack of 
fair dealing (ἀσυναλλαξία); at the other, another, less predictable vice which has no name of 
its own, but has something to do with ‘excessive legalism’ or ‘excessive justice’ (τὸ 
ἀκροδίκαιον). That doctrine may well contain a hint of self-conscious Peripatetic opposition to 
some contemporary Stoics’ and other Greeks’ rigid insistence on strict enforcement of 
contracts and justice, discussed above. 
 
The word ἀκροδίκαιος is very rare, scarcely attested elsewhere outside lexica. It is closely 
related to the slightly less rare word ἀκριβοδίκαιος, used by Philo and some Christian authors. 
It was that latter word which Aristotle himself had used in defining the nature of ἐπιείκεια 
(‘decency’), which he regarded as a species of justice itself: the decent man is the one who does 
not insist on strict justice when it has bad consequences, but takes less than his share in such 
cases, even when the law is on his side (ὁ μὴ ἀκριβοδίκαιος ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἀλλ’ ἐλαττωτικός, 
καίπερ ἔχων τὸν νόμον βοηθόν, ἐπιεικής ἐστι).116 This partly recalls the way in which citizens 
                                                 
116 Arist. Eth. Nic. 1138a1–2. Aristotle certainly does not argue in his discussion of ἐπιείκεια 
for disregard of law and legal principles, but rather for a subtle approach in difficult cases, 
informed by the lawgiver’s intention (compare Brunschwig 1996); but that lawgiver’s intention 
should itself always include concern for the common good of the polis and the ethical 
flourishing of its citizens (cf. Arist. Pol. 1280a34–b35). 
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of a good Aristotelian polis will make their formally private property ‘common in use’ when 
the need arises, rather than insist on their exclusive legal right to it.117 
 
The fact that Aristotle and the Peripatetics made the attempt to define and analyse the 
uncommon Greek concept of the ἀκροδίκαιον suggests that they had a particular interest in 
addressing its ethical status. Significantly, the abstract noun ἀσυναλλαξία is also a rare word.118 
One of the few surviving occurrences is in Fabius Maximus’ letter to Dyme, discussed above, 
in which it was used to condemn the overturning of contracts by Sosos’ rebels. This unexpected 
similarity in unusual abstract vocabulary between the two apparently quite different texts is 
itself a vivid sign that the question of the ethical and political status of contracts moved to 
centre stage in both philosophical and popular ethics at this particular stage of Greek history.119 
 
As well as insisting on particular traditional elements of Greek ethics, the later Hellenistic 
Peripatetics also retained a self-conscious interest in traditional political theorising, focussed 
on the small-scale polis. The Stobaean summary of Peripatetic ethics ends with a quite faithful 
summary of key elements of Aristotle’s Politics, discussing, for example, constitutions, stasis 
and civic education. This section includes reflection on means of pursuing harmony within the 
                                                 
117 Arist. Pol. 1263a37–9. 
118 For the opposite value, εὐσυναλλαξία, consider another work attributed to a later Hellenistic 
Peripatetic, but also influenced by Stoicism: [Andronicus of Rhodes] On the Passions Book II, 
7.2, l. 15: Ε ὐ σ υ ν α λ λ α ξ ί α  δὲ ἕξις ἐν συναλλαγαῖς φυλάττουσα τὸ δίκαιον; compare Glibert-
Thirry 1977: ch. 2, esp. 11–29. 
119 For the related adjective ἀσυνάλλακτος in another later Hellenistic text concerned with the 
politics and ethics of debt contracts: Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5.66.3; compare 1.41.1. 
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close-knit city-state, through common education and dining.120 Moreover, Seneca claims that 
‘some Peripatetics’ claimed that politics should be a fourth major branch of philosophy, 
alongside the three branches conventional in the Hellenistic period (logic, physics and 
ethics).121 
 
Some Peripatetics, were, therefore, among the most concerted Hellenistic advocates of the 
particular civic ideal, prominent in the Classical period and beyond, of the autonomous, 
harmonious, close-knit polis of virtue, whose needs and values may sometimes legitimately 
override the sanctity of contracts or narrow ‘justice’. Significantly, relevant Peripatetic 
approaches were not necessarily confined to narrow philosophical circles. As Hahm and 
Sharples have argued, some leading Peripatetics, especially the second-century scholarch 
Critolaus, enjoyed a significant public reputation, not least as highly visible anti-Stoics.122 
Moreover, biography represented a major, accessible Hellenistic genre in which Peripatetics 
were prominent, as authors and subjects. For example, the Hellenistic biographical tradition 
about Aristotle himself was complex and contested, with stories and counter-stories about 
Aristotle’s own political activities circulating for public consumption;123 it was probably within 
the context of such disputes that the purported Athenian honorary decree for Aristotle was 
forged.124 
 
                                                 
120 Sharples 2010: text 15A, sections 45–52. 
121 Sen. Ep. 89.9–10 (Sharples 2010: text 5D). 
122 See Hahm 2007; Sharples 2010: esp. 1–2; compare Inwood 2014: ch. 3. 
123 See Aristocles of Messana fr. 2. 
124 Cf. Haake 2013: 93–6. 
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Aristotle’s writings themselves were probably also gaining a wider audience, partly through 
the efforts of Greeks of Asia Minor. Strabo claims that, around the beginning of the first century 
BC, Apellikon of Teos discovered ‘Aristotle’s books’, presumably Aristotle’s own copies of 
his works,125 lying buried on peasants’ land in the territory of the polis of Skepsis in the 
Troad.126 Apellikon, a native of another polis of Western Asia Minor, published a hasty edition 
of the books. This itself suggests that he anticipated a ready market for them.127 After Sulla 
captured Athens, he deported the books to Rome, as plunder. At Rome, the first scholarly work 
on the books was undertaken by Tyrannion of Amisus, a ‘lover of Aristotle’ (a φιλαριστοτέλης 
man) who had, appropriately, been given the birth-name of Theophrastos in his Pontic 
homeland in Northern Asia Minor.128 
 
There are also signs that broader interest in the Classical Athenian philosophical schools, 
including the Peripatos, had an impact on civic life in the Greek cities, especially in Asia Minor. 
According to Posidonius, Apellikon of Teos was himself an associate of Athenion of Athens, 
because of their shared Peripatetic philosophical school (hairesis).129 Similarly, Strabo claims 
that Diodoros of Adrammytion, who claimed to be one of the philosophers from the Academy 
                                                 
125 It is likely that other copies of many of his works, even esoteric ones, had remained available 
in the interim: see Barnes 1997; Primavesi 2007; Hatzimachali 2013: 3. The issue is, however, 
still debated (Schofield 2013: xv). 
126 Strabo 13.1.54. 
127 Hatzimachali 2013: 15. 
128 Strabo 13.1.54; Plut. Sull. 26.1. On his name: Hesychius Illustrius fr. 7, ll. 992–4 (Müller 
FHG). 
129 Posidonius fr. 253, ll. 156–7. 
42 
 
(τῶν τε ἐξ Ἀκαδημίας φιλοσόφων εἶναι) and also to be skilled in rhetoric (καὶ δίκας λέγειν καὶ 
σοφιστεύειν τὰ ῥητορικά), sided with Mithridates in the First Mithridatic War, slaughtering the 
council of his home city.130 Strabo also recounts nearby how another Academic, Metrodoros 
of Skepsis, transferred his interest ‘from philosophy to politics’ and became involved at 
Mithridates’ court.131 
 
It is, however, certain later Hellenistic honorific inscriptions of poleis of more southerly Asia 
Minor which offer the most vivid, though still fleeting, traces of practical appeal in Hellenistic 
cities to civic ideals inspired by Classical Athenian philosophies. Some such texts contain 
isolated but striking echoes of the ideas of fourth-century Athenian philosophical schools. 
Significantly, such rhetoric could serve to assert very substantial, demanding notions of the 
common good and of civic virtue. Such rhetoric reinforced the tendency of many such decrees 
to paint the good citizen as a ‘polis fanatic’.132 Indeed, though the four striking claims analysed 
in the following paragraphs might look like isolated fragments within the relevant inscriptions, 
the four decrees in question all put continuous emphasis on far-reaching polis commitment and 
civic virtue. 
 
The most striking example occurs in a decree of the Otorkondeis, a sub-division of the polis of 
Mylasa, dating to 76 BC. The benefactor Iatrokles is praised for helping individuals and the 
whole demos. He has also given loans and released certain struggling debtors from their debt 
contracts, even returning their deposits, ‘believing that justice is more beneficial than injustice’ 
                                                 
130 Strabo 13.1.66. 
131 Strabo 13.1.55. For these two figures, see Ferrary 1988: 483–4. 
132 Wörrle 1995. 
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(λυσιτελεστέραν ἡγούμενος τὴν δικαιοσύ[νην] τῆς ἀδικίας).133 This claim echoes very closely 
Plato’s Republic. Plato’s Socrates claims towards the end of Book I, in his argument against 
Thrasymachos, that injustice is never more beneficial than justice (οὐδέποτ' ἄρα, ὦ μακάριε 
Θρασύμαχε, λυσιτελέστερον ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης]).134 This is no simply random sentence of 
the Republic for the Mylasa decree to echo: Socrates goes on to develop precisely the argument 
summarised in this one line in the whole of the rest of the Republic, emphasising the intrinsic 
benefits of justice for the just man. The words in the decree can thus be seen as an allusion to 
the central concerns of Plato’s Republic, including its defining interest in social and psychic 
harmony and the importance of citizens strongly identifying with the collective.135 There is no 
reason to doubt the possibility of wide acquaintance with Plato: Plato’s and Socrates’ ideas 
were certainly held in high esteem around this time in nearby Miletus.136 
 
Very significantly for the argument of this chapter, the probable allusion to the strongly 
community-centred ethics of Plato’s Republic at Mylasa was used in a way which cast doubt 
on the justice of always scrupulously respecting debt contracts. In releasing people from 
oppressive debt contracts, Iatrokles was acting, not charitably,137 but justly. Insisting strictly on 
property rights and debt contracts would have been both unjust and unprofitable. There is a 
clear contrast here with the claims of Polybius and some Stoics that strict observance of, and 
                                                 
133 I.Mylasa 109, ll. 4–10. 
134 Pl. Resp. 353e7–354a9; compare 354b7; 360c8. 
135 This theme in the Republic does issue in some explicit moral condemnation of profiteering 
through loan-giving: see, for example, 555e4–556b5. 
136 See Haake 2007: 228–31, discussing I.Milet 734. 
137 For that approach, see SEG 39.1243, col. III, ll. 38–47. 
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insistence on, contracts and formal entitlements is the route to both virtue and general well-
being. 
 
Although the most striking example involves a probable allusion to Plato, there are some 
similar traces of community-centred application of Aristotelian and Peripatetic ethics. The 
three most interesting cases derive from a single city, Priene, within quite a short time span 
(later second and first century BC). This is unlikely to be a coincidence: even if any one of the 
three would not be compelling in isolation, the combination of the three suggests that 
Peripatetic ideas were influential on later Hellenistic Prienian debates about wealth, virtue and 
citizenship.  
 
The latest of these decrees is the first-century BC decree for the naturalised Prienian A. 
Aemilius Zosimos. That decree praises Zosimos for knowing that virtue alone brings the 
greatest fruits and rewards from a community of men, probably including foreigners, who hold 
‘the fine’ in honour (συνιδὼν δ’ ὅτι μόνη μεγίστους ἀποδίδωσιν ἡ ἀρετὴ καρποὺς καὶ χάριτας 
π[αρὰ ξένοις κ]α̣ὶ ἀστοῖς τὸ καλὸν ἐν τιμῇ θεμένοις).138 The explicit reference to the capacity 
of virtue alone to bring the greatest benefits and rewards suggests an acquaintance with 
philosophical arguments in favour of virtue, which tended to stress the benefits of virtue for 
the virtuous agent. The particular approach of these lines evokes specifically Aristotelian and 
Peripatetic, rather than Platonic or Stoic, versions of the argument that virtue benefits the 
virtuous agent: the decree presents virtue as a strongly social and public-spirited disposition, 
which the members of a political community can join together in cultivating and valuing, in a 
                                                 
138 I.Priene2 68 (new edition of I.Priene 112), ll. 13–14. 
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way which is mutually beneficial for all of them.139 Interestingly, the vision here of the Prienian 
political community as a mutually supportive group dedicated to honouring an abstract ideal 
of ‘the fine’ recalls precisely the Aristotelian or Peripatetic view to which, I suggested above, 
Polybius was self-consciously reacting in his portrayal of the Achaian League: the view that a 
polis necessarily exists for the sake of the good life, rather than utility or ‘mere life’.140  
 
This decree for Zosimos picked up and developed the themes of some slightly earlier Prienian 
honorary decrees, especially the later second-century decrees for the brothers Athenopolis and 
Moschion. The decree for Athenopolis praises him for maintaining his good will towards his 
home city, ‘thinking that what belongs to himself most of all is the maintenance of 
assiduousness towards those conducting their lives together with him’ (νομίζων το[ῦτο α]ὑτῶι 
μέγιστον ὑπάρχειν τὸ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς συν̣α̣να<σ>τρ[ε]φ̣ο̣[μέν]ους ἐκτένειαν συντηρεῖν).141 This 
again recalls the specifically Aristotelian and Peripatetic version of the eudaimonist idea that 
personal happiness is necessarily dependent on virtue: the thing which is most proper to a man 
(compare [α]ὑτῶι μέγιστον ὑπάρχειν) is the fulfilment of his natural function, which he 
achieves through virtuous activity of the soul (ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια142 κατ’ ἀρετήν), guided by 
reason.143 This part of the decree for Athenopolis also recalls the traditional Aristotelian and 
Peripatetic concern with humans’ interdependence, and its ethical consequences: a virtuous life 
for any individual must have a strongly social and public-spirited component, in as far as he is 
                                                 
139 On Aristotle’s commitment to this type of approach: Cooper 2010. 
140 See especially Arist. Pol. 1280a34–b35. 
141 I.Priene2 63 (new edition of I.Priene 107), ll. 17–21. 
142 Compare the decree’s ἐκτένεια, though it conveys ‘assiduousness’ rather than ‘activity’. 
143 Arist. Eth. Nic. 1098a7–18. 
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a human being and lives together with multiple others (ᾗ δ' ἄνθρωπός ἐστι καὶ πλείοσι συζῇ).144 
In other words, it is central to a good life to maintain good relations with those with whom one 
shares ties of interdependence (compare τοὺς συν̣α̣να<σ>τρ[ε]φ̣ο[̣μέν]ους). 
 
In both the decree for Athenopolis and the one for Zosimos, the abstract language about virtue 
and its benefits had implicit practical implications about wealth and property: the good citizen 
does not hoard his wealth, insisting on his formal entitlement to use it principally for private 
purposes, but freely donates much of it to support the collective civic life of his fellow citizens. 
These practical implications were, however, spelled out far more clearly in the third relevant 
Prienian text, the later second-century decree for Athenopolis’ brother Moschion. Moschion 
was praised for providing both money and sureties for loans from his personal fortune in a 
fiscal crisis, ‘treating the property as common to all citizens’ (διαλαβ[ὼν κ]οινὴν εἶναι τ̣ὴ̣[ν] 
οὐσίαν πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν).145 There is a striking echo here of Aristotle’s famous doctrine 
(mentioned above) that, although genuine communism is undesirable, citizens should be 
willing to treat their private property as ‘common in use’ in times of collective need.146 A strong 
indication that the decree drafter intended Moschion to be seen as acting from a considered, 
intellectual position is that he does not simply describe him as in practice sharing his resources 
by making them common,147 but attributes to Moschion himself this distinctive attitude to the 
nature of his property. He does so, like the drafters of the other decrees considered in these 
                                                 
144 Arist. Eth. Nic. 1178b5–6. 
145 I.Priene2 64 (new edition of I.Priene 108), ll. 89–97. 
146 Arist. Pol. 1263a37–9. 
147 That kind of description finds parallels in texts unlikely to reflect Aristotelian influence: 
consider Dem. 20.44. 
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paragraphs, by using the participle of a verb of thinking, διαλαβ[ὼν] (compare ἡγούμενος, 
νομίζων and συνιδὼν in the other examples). 
 
This case probably, therefore, represents another self-conscious allusion to fourth-century 
Athenian philosophical ethics. Like the probable Platonic allusion at Mylasa, this probable 
Aristotelian allusion calls into question any dogmatic insistence on the immutability of private 
property rights, or even any sharp barrier between public and private. Interdependent fellow 
citizens, all members of one demos, in fact share many interests and goods, to an extent which 
more contractual notions of the polis cannot address. Benevolence to one’s community, 
including willingness to adapt or bend property rights and debt contracts for the sake of justice, 
harmony and the common good, is integral to virtue. 
 
Surviving honorary decrees preserve only a very small fraction of the civic discourse of later 
Hellenistic poleis. It is difficult to tell whether the strikingly Classicising claims in these four 
inscriptions of Mylasa and Priene were fragments of wider tendencies in the rhetoric of the 
later Hellenistic assembly, agora and gymnasium. Some other decrees do sometimes reveal 
similar overlaps with Peripatetic language and ideas.148 The likelihood of a wider pattern is 
much increased by contextual evidence about later Hellenistic civic education. Later 
Hellenistic citizens would have imbibed Platonic and Peripatetic teaching, as well as other 
philosophical ideas, from varied sources. Some made trips to philosophical centres such as 
Athens and Rhodes, but many also benefited from philosophical teaching, lectures, reading and 
                                                 
148 See Gray 2013a. 
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debates in local gymnasia.149 Indeed, the three Prienian decrees discussed above could reflect, 
for example, the evidence of one or two charismatic Peripatetic philosophy teachers. 
 
Significantly, it is quite probable that many Hellenistic Peripatetics, in particular, concentrated 
their efforts on teaching and oral lectures and discussion,150 aimed at educating active citizens, 
rather than on written dogmatic works. Cicero identifies the Hellenistic Peripatetics as leaders 
in rhetorical and political education.151 Similarly, Dionysius of Halicarnassus advocated his 
own brand of rhetorical training and Classicism, oriented around the Attic orators, as a 
challenge to the Peripatetics’ dominant position as teachers of rhetoric.152 
 
An inscription which identifies sites of later Hellenistic philosophical education of ephebes at 
Athens mentions the Academy, Lyceum and Ptolemaion.153 This too suggests that the older 
philosophical schools were dominant over the newer Hellenistic ones in civic education, in this 
particular case and probably also in the structure of the curriculum. Admittedly, philosophers 
from the newer schools, especially the Stoa, could sometimes lecture in the physical homes of 
                                                 
149 For the vibrant life of Hellenistic civic gymnasia, see Kah and Scholz 2004; for a particular 
example of philosophical studies in a polis, see I.Iasos 98. 
150 Compare Inwood 2014: e.g. 75. 
151 Griffin 1997: 9–10; Wiater 2011a: 33–40, discussing Cic. De Or. 1.43, 3.57–76, esp. 62; 
Brut. 119–20; Tusc. 2.9. 
152 See Wiater 2011a: 47–52, discussing Dionysius’ First Letter to Ammaeus. 
153 IG II2 1006 (122/1 BC), ll. 19–20. Compare Haake 2007: 44–55. 
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the older ones.154 However, they would have suffered the rhetorical disadvantage of having to 
do so within the traditional homes of their philosophical rivals. 
 
A suggestive piece of evidence for the priorities of Hellenistic Peripatetic teachers is a rare case 
of a polis honouring a philosopher for his teaching:155 a decree of c. 200 BC passed by the 
Samians in honour of a certain Epikrates of Herakleia. Significantly, this Epikrates was both 
explicitly identified as a Peripatetic and praised for having waived his fees specifically for those 
poorer citizens who were unable to pay (τοῖς τε [μὴ] δ̣υναμένοις τῶν δ[η]μοτῶν τελεῖν [τὸν] 
ἐκκείμενον ὑφ’ αὑτοῦ μισθὸν προῖκα [σχο]λάζων).156 This example of Peripatetic social 
conscience, expressed in benevolent action and teaching, is useful for explaining the orientation 
of the rhetoric of some of the decrees discussed above. Epikrates probably belonged to a vibrant 
group of Hellenistic Peripatetics who were leading Hellenistic intellectual champions of 
demanding ideals of solidarity and tireless commitment to education and virtue. 
 
As a result of the nature of the subsequent development of the Roman Empire and its Greek 
intellectuals and cities, only traces of the efforts and ideas of such Hellenistic Peripatetics 
remain, in Strabonic anecdotes, Stobaean doxography and honorific inscriptions. Relevant 
Peripatetics probably did, however, have a key role to play in Hellenistic intellectual and 
political arguments: that of advocating the traditional, Classical small-scale, participatory, self-
governing, solidaristic polis as still the fundamental, irreplaceable basis for a worthwhile 
human life, in opposition to the alternative ethico-political models and innovations advocated 
                                                 
154 Compare Ferrary 1988: 438–41; Haake 2007: 47, with n. 147.  
155 For some other recently published cases, see Haake 2009, 2010; in general, see Haake 2007. 
156 IG XII 6 1 128, ll. 21–4; cf. Scholz 2004, 119–20; Haake 2007, 185–90. 
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by Hellenistic Stoics, Academic Sceptics and Epicureans. These schools were, of course, like 
the Peripatetics, heterogeneous, with many internal disagreements about doctrines, not least 
concerning the question of how, if at all, the relevant school’s ethical teaching should be 
applied to practical politics. Many were not interested in practical questions at all.157 This 
tendency itself, however, created an opening for those philosophers, including certain 
Peripatetics, who did seek to bind theory and practice together more closely. 
 
Posidonius’ Athenion as a Peripatetic 
 
Posidonius’ presentation of the Athenian tyrant Athenion, with which this chapter began, itself 
takes on a different complexion when put in the context of these broader roles of certain 
Peripatetics in Hellenistic political education and debates. Though it must remain a matter of 
interpretation, in the absence of explicit comment by Posidonius, a strong case can be made 
that Posidonius, as a philosopher himself, expected readers to infer a link between Athenion’s 
Peripatetic leanings and some of his behaviour and rhetoric,158 even though he also reveals 
many other, quite different ideological influences. 
 
In the light of the role of certain Peripatetics as leading Hellenistic defenders of traditional 
community-centred polis ideals, it would have been easy for Posidonius’ contemporary readers 
to deduce that Athenion was able to advocate those ideals with ease and authority before the 
Athenian audience (see section 2 above) partly because he had imbibed Peripatetic teaching, 
                                                 
157 Compare Gotter 2003: 174–5. 
158 Compare Ferrary (1988: 474–6): Posidonius indulges in ‘anti-Peripatetic polemic’, stressing 
the Peripatetic attachments of Athenion and Apellikon. 
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and had a reputation as a Peripatetic. This possibility is worth exploring further, because it adds 
a new dimension to the argument that certain later Hellenistic Peripatetics and anti-Peripatetics 
contested the value of Classical Athenian expressions of ideals of solidarity and equality, 
including the elaborations of those ideals by Aristotle and subsequent Peripatetics themselves. 
 
This basic argument that Posidonius’ Athenion should be seen partly as characteristically 
Peripatetic depends only on the fact that he expresses traditional civic ideals of polis autonomy 
and solidarity, as Hellenistic Peripatetic thinkers and teachers often did, in contrast to adherents 
of other Hellenistic philosophical schools, which had other priorities. The argument does not 
require that Posidonius’ Athenion says anything more specifically Aristotelian or Peripatetic, 
though that would give it greater strength. It is true there is little uniquely Peripatetic in 
Athenion’s specific words. This reflects, however, the nature of Peripatetic ethics, also evident 
earlier in this article. Aristotelians were distinguished in ethics and other fields by their method 
of collecting mainstream assumptions and thinking, and systematising them into philosophical 
form.159 As already evident above, Aristotle and the Peripatetics laid great stress on widespread 
Greek civic values also given prominence by Posidonius’ Athenion, including ὁμόνοια,160 the 
common good or the good of the polis (τὸ τῆς πατρίδος συμφέρον)161 and active political and 
                                                 
159 See especially Arist. Eth. Nic. I.4. 
160 See, for example, Arist. Eth. Nic. 1167a22–b16, where Aristotle himself comments on this 
value’s pervasive popularity. 
161 Arist. Pol. 1278b21–3; 1279a25–31; 1280a25–1281a8; Sharples 2010: text 15A, sections 4 
and 12. 
52 
 
civic participation.162 They also, like Posidonius’ Athenion, drew some strongly anti-egoistic 
conclusions from those community-centred values, condemning on ethical grounds both 
excessive insistence on strict financial entitlements (see above) and the practice of money-
lending at interest.163 By emphasising educational and cultural institutions among the central 
civic institutions he sees threatened, Posidonius’ Athenion also taps into another central Greek 
civic preoccupation on which Aristotle and Peripatetics laid particular stress: the fundamental 
role of παιδεία (education) in sustaining united, free political life.164 
 
Moreover, some aspects of Athenion’s rhetoric do echo more specific Aristotelian and 
Peripatetic ideas. In the mouth of a Peripatetic, the castigation of the Athenians’ acquiescence 
in ‘anarchy’ (ἀναρχία)165 calls to mind Aristotle’s famous ‘political animal’ argument: it is in 
men’s nature that they aspire to live in civic communities of citizens under a constitution.166 
Athenion can be seen to be exhorting the Athenians to remember their fundamentally political 
nature as human beings: to stand up for the civic institutions which enable them to fulfil their 
true natures, through strenuous political participation. They should not leave to the Romans the 
crucial role of deliberating about the fundamental question of how they should conduct their 
                                                 
162 See, for example, Arist. Pol. 1253a1–4, 1277b7–16, 1283b42–1284a3; Sharples 2010: text 
15A, section 47. 
163 Arist. Eth. Nic. 1138a1–2; Pol. 1258b2–8. 
164 Compare especially Arist. Pol. 1263b36–7; note also Pol. Book VIII. Compare Sharples 
2010: text 15A, section 52. 
165 Posidonius fr. 253, ll. 94–103. 
166 See Books I–III of Aristotle’s Politics. 
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civic life (περὶ τοῦ πῶς ἡμᾶς πολιτεύεσθαι δεῖ),167 a role which Aristotle made central to the 
activities of good citizens, describing it in similar words.168 
 
Most significantly of all, Aristotle himself explicitly deplores ἀναρχία. At one point, he 
criticises the fact that, in certain Cretan cities, powerful citizens can suspend the appointment 
of the leading magistrates (κόσμοι) at will; the resulting ἀκοσμία can breed civic strife and 
ἀναρχία, in a way which threatens to dissolve the civic community.169 Aristotle’s linking of 
absence of magistrates, imposed from above, with the collapse of the political community is 
strikingly close to Posidonius’ Athenion’s point that the whole civic life of the Athenians, 
including political, legal, religious, cultural and educational institutions, is being destroyed by 
their tolerance of Roman-imposed ἀναρχία, also involving literal ‘lack of magistrates’. 
Posidonius could well have had in mind this Aristotelian argument or a similar argument by a 
later Peripatetic, now lost. 
 
The overlaps with Peripatetic ideas raised so far do not involve obvious distortion of Peripatetic 
values, even if Athenion applies them in idiosyncratic ways. In at least one other case, it is 
plausible to interpret Posidonius’ Athenion as applying in a clearly distorted, demagogic way 
a famous Aristotelian doctrine. The relevant part is Athenion’s claim to the Athenians that they 
                                                 
167 Posidonius fr. 253, ll. 96–7. 
168 Arist. Eth. Nic. 1112a28–34, for example, implies that reflection about how one’s own 
community should πολιτεύεσθαι is a central part of deliberation: by contrast, no Spartan (for 
example) deliberates about how the Scythians would best conduct their civic life (πῶς ἂν 
Σκύθαι ἄριστα πολιτεύοιντο).  
169 Arist. Pol. 1272b1–15. 
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are now commanding themselves, even if he has taken the lead; if they show solidarity, he will 
have as much power and potential as all of them combined (καὶ ἂν συνεπισχύσητε, τοσοῦτον 
δυνήσομαι ὅσον κοινῇ πάντες ὑμεῖς).170 This recalls one of Aristotle’s famous, qualified 
arguments for a broad-based, rather than narrowly elitist, constitution: if many diverse citizens 
participate in a city’s politics, the virtue and wisdom of individual citizens is aggregated. 
According to Aristotle, the citizens become in this way almost ‘one person’, with many 
combined limbs and faculties of soul.171 Posidonius’ Athenion is claiming to be almost the 
incarnation of this exceptional, imaginary super-individual, who combines within himself all 
the strengths which the Athenians possess collectively. It would not be surprising for the 
democrat-Peripatetic Athenion to evoke this particular point in Aristotle’s own work where 
Aristotle comes closest to fusing Aristotelian and democratic thinking. 
 
The general style of Athenion’s rhetoric and leadership can also be seen as a distorted 
application of certain Peripatetic practices and values. Posidonius’ Athenion displays great 
rhetorical skill as a civic orator, capable of persuading an assembly, which is in keeping with 
many Hellenistic Peripatetics’ focus on rhetoric, discussed above. Moreover, in the course of 
his rhetoric, Athenion exhibits, as Kidd and Chaniotis have each emphasised, extravagant 
passions (πάθη) and desires, behaving like a theatrical actor, and stokes similar desires in the 
Athenian people.172 Significantly, the Hellenistic Peripatetics maintained, now in a polemically 
anti-Stoic manner, a commitment to the Aristotelian idea that the passions (πάθη), suitably 
                                                 
170 Posidonius fr. 253, ll. 108–110.  
171 See Arist. Pol. 1281a42–b7. 
172 See Kidd 1988–1999: vol. II ii), 870, 873, 886; Chaniotis 2013: 202–204. For destabilising 
theatricality, compare Posidonius fr. 257, with Kidd 1988–1999: vol. II ii), 898–9.  
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moderated, should play a central, positive role in ethical deliberation and motivation.173 Even 
if a Peripatetic observer would have condemned Athenion for far exceeding the bounds of 
‘moderation of passion’ (μετριοπάθεια), Posidonius probably intended his portrayal to be a 
vivid example to readers less favourable to the Peripatetics of the dangers which Peripatetic 
sympathy with the passions might unleash.174 
 
It is, therefore, highly plausible to interpret Posidonius’ Athenion as applying certain 
Aristotelian and Peripatetic ideas and practices, especially the more utopian and community-
oriented ones, in radical, provocative ways. This Athenion must be seen as being highly 
selective among Aristotelian and Peripatetic doctrines, ignoring more moderate ones. He must 
also be seen as combining his particular idiosyncratic interpretation of Peripatetic ethics and 
politics with many other values, especially democratic ones, to innovative and destabilising 
effect. 
 
A potential problem for this argument is that the account preserved in Athenaeus does contain 
two explicit claims that Athenion transgressed Aristotelian and Peripatetic standards. First, 
Athenion is accused of getting out of the way the ‘right-thinking citizens’ (τοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας) 
of Athens on taking power as tyrant, contrary to Aristotle’s and Theophrastus’ ideas. 
                                                 
173 See the evidence collected and analysed in Sharples 2010: ch. 16; also Inwood 2014: e.g. 
74. 
174 Compare Kidd 1997: 43, 45. On recent debates about Posidonius’ position on the passions, 
and its relationship with Stoic orthodoxy: Gill 2006: 266–290. 
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Subsequently, it is claimed that, while ruling as tyrant, Athenion forgot about Peripatetic 
principles in assigning rations to the Athenians more appropriate to chickens than to men.175 
 
These comments could be taken to show that Posidonius did not wish Athenion to be seen as 
applying his Peripatetic ideas in any way during the events recounted. However, the two claims 
about Athenion contravening Peripatetic standards are the parts of the account most likely to 
have been added by Athenaeus: they directly support Athenaeus’ aim of exposing philosophical 
charlatans, who failed to live up to their own teachings. Even if, as is more likely (see section 
2), Posidonius was the author of the whole extract, these two claims do not present a major 
problem. The two remarks are not blanket assessments of Athenion’s conduct, but comments 
on specific, clearly unjust actions, committed after Athenion has become an obvious tyrant. 
They do not necessarily apply to Athenion’s earlier actions and words, including his speeches 
to the Athenians. Indeed, the second claim, that Athenion ‘forgot’ Peripatetic principles at this 
point (ἐπιλαθόμενος τῶν δογμάτων τῶν τοῦ Περιπάτου), clearly allows that he remembered 
them at earlier stages. It even implies it. 
 
Posidonius probably, therefore, wished to suggest that Athenion initially relied on Peripatetic 
political ideals, especially in his rousing speeches to the Athenians, but cast them aside after 
gaining tyrannical power. In other words, he exploited certain Peripatetic ideals in a way which 
brought him into conflict with other, more respectable Peripatetic ideals. This interpretation is 
                                                 
175 Posidonius fr. 253, ll. 117–20, 157–60. 
57 
 
consistent with what is known of Posidonius’ broader approach: he was favourable to some 
parts of Aristotelian and Peripatetic philosophy and argumentation,176 but hostile to others.177 
 
A strong case can, therefore, be made that Posidonius’ portrayal of Athenion was a vitriolic 
satire, not only on certain radical applications of particular Classical Athenian civic ideals, but 
also on the specific role of certain Peripatetic ideas, thinkers and rhetoricians in the shaping 
and spreading of relevant approaches. In that case, the Athenion passage shows that Posidonius, 
like Polybius (see section 3 above), was strongly hostile to certain Peripatetic values and 
philosophers. The shared anti-Peripatetic animus of these pro-Roman thinkers, sceptical about 
strong community and equality, serves further to strengthen the case that certain Hellenistic 
Peripatetics were at the forefront of moves to apply certain Classical civic ideals, including 
Aristotle’s own, in a way which questioned the existing distribution of power and property, 
and ideologies favourable to it. 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
 
There were vibrant later Hellenistic debates about the form of the best polis, and the 
implications for Greco-Roman relations. A significant number of later Hellenistic intellectuals 
stressed the overriding justice and inviolability of formal contracts, agreements and property 
rights. They did so partly in support of older Greek ideals, but also in reaction against other 
Classical Athenian ideals, under the influence of approaches prominent at Rome. They also 
advocated their case partly in reaction against dynamic opponents. These included both 
                                                 
176 See Posidonius T85; frs. 30–5, 142–9, 157–69. 
177 Posidonius fr. 70, ll. 42–59, with Kidd 1988–1999: vol. II ii), 636–8. 
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democrats and some who insisted on the more community-centred aspects of Classical Greek 
ethics, calling on certain Aristotelian and Peripatetic ideas, in particular, for support. Indeed, 
the evidence considered in section 4 suggests that a quite prominent, sharp-edged brand of 
Classicism was in circulation in some later Hellenistic circles. Ferrary is surely right that 
philosophical and rhetorical schools did not, as a general rule, serve as centres of resistance to 
Rome.178 However, some philosophers, alongside other Greeks, probably did embrace forms 
of Classicism which challenged certain political, social and, above all, ethical changes 
associated with the Roman conquest. 
 
The relevant brand of Classicism was sufficiently prominent and sharp-edged for Polybius, 
Posidonius and probably also some other Stoics to subject it to ferocious satire and opposition. 
The combination of this intellectual and ideological opposition with Roman military power and 
prestige must have been very successful. Indeed, more moderate forms of Classicism seem to 
have become dominant within the first century BC. These more moderate forms involved far 
less stress on radical equality, egalitarian solidarity, justice, democracy or untrammelled 
popular sovereignty. They gave prominence, instead, to ethical language about virtue, 
harmony, humanity, education and self-control, closer to Isocrates than to Demosthenes.179  
 
This alternative Classicising language was, understandably, less likely to be used to advocate 
political change: indeed, its advocates were often strongly paternalistic, and very comfortable 
with the unequal status quo in politics and socio-economic life. On the other hand, such 
                                                 
178 Ferrary 1988: 489–90. 
179 Note that a Samian benefactor of the Augustan age even adopted the name ‘Isocrates’ (IG 
XII 6 1 293). 
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language could also be much gentler and more universalistic than the radical Classicism studied 
here: it helped to delineate a new model of cultural citizenship, centred on paideia, 
cosmopolitanism and philanthropia. 
 
Direct Roman cultural and ideological intervention must have played a significant role in 
encouraging new, gentler forms of Classicism.180 Nevertheless, another crucial contribution to 
the process came from Greek citizens and intellectuals themselves. The commonly quite 
flamboyant rhetoric of later Hellenistic poleis’ honorary decrees often took much less radically 
egalitarian, politicised forms than those discussed in section 4: there was much praise for the 
education and humanity of civic benefactors, eager to ensure the welfare of their less fortunate 
fellow citizens, but also to advance ideals of culture and civilisation.181 These types of honorific 
language overlap closely with the descriptions of the ethical and political virtues of good elites 
in both Diodorus Siculus and Dionysius of Halicarnassus.182 Those two intellectuals provide 
the most vivid evidence of a less radically egalitarian form of appeal to the Classical Athenian 
past, more cultural, ethical and cosmopolitan than directly political, in the later Hellenistic 
world; see the chapters by Wiater and Holton in this volume.183 
 
This shift in prominent values helps to explain further why only traces of more radical forms 
of Classicism survive in the literary and epigraphic evidence preserved for us, through the filter 
of the Roman Empire. Indeed, even some later Hellenistic Peripatetics were influenced by these 
                                                 
180 See Spawforth 2012. 
181 See Gray 2013a; 2013c: esp. 150–2. 
182 See Gray 2013c: 151–2. 
183 Also the papers in Wiater and Schmitz 2011. 
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broad shifts. Some associated themselves closely with Roman power, as intellectual 
companions of the Roman elite: examples include Staseas of Naples, house-guest of Piso in 
Cicero’s De Finibus; Cratippus of Pergamon, associate of Brutus and tutor of Cicero’s son at 
Athens;184 and Nicolaus of Damascus, associate and biographer of Augustus himself. Other 
Peripatetics of this period, now based at Rome and Alexandria rather than Athens, innovated 
in the development of another form of Classicism, similarly lacking in an immediate, sharp 
political edge, which was to become very prominent in the Roman Empire: commentary on 
Classical texts.185 Some leading Peripatetics, such as Boethus of Sidon, Xenarchus of Seleuceia 
and Andronicus of Rhodes, concentrated on technical Aristotelian scholarship and fields such 
as logic and metaphysics.186 
 
Being Peripatetic thus became as much about critical method and textual focus as about any 
substantial shared doctrines; there was probably no ‘Peripatetic orthodoxy’.187 This move from 
‘late Hellenistic’ engagement with doxai and arguments to a ‘post-Hellenistic’ concentration 
on texts188 was probably partly a reaction against earlier tendencies within the Peripatos, 
including its focus on teaching, civic engagement and imaginative elaboration of Aristotle’s 
doctrines. Such a reaction would help to explain why the Stoicising Strabo praised these later, 
more technical Peripatetics for ‘Aristotelising’ (ἀριστοτελίζειν) better, harshly condemning 
                                                 
184 Cf. Haake 2007: 264–9. 
185 See Hatzimachali 2013: 1–2, citing M. Frede; cf. Inwood 2014: 75. 
186 Schofield 2013: xv–xvi, with Chiaradonna 2013 and Falcon 2013; compare Ferrary 1988: 
466–7. 
187 Schofield 2013: xv, xvii–xviii. 
188 See Chiaradonna 2013. 
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earlier Peripatetics for merely ‘prattling about commonplaces’ (θέσεις ληκυθίζειν).189 As part 
of the same complex first-century BC developments, intellectual teachers encountered in this 
chapter, including Strabo himself and Dionysius of Halicarnassus as well as Cicero, sought to 
offer alternative programmes of political education to rival or supplement the traditional ones 
associated with the Peripatetics. 
 
Significantly, the new, less radically egalitarian form of Classicism mainly superseded not only 
more radical forms of Classicism, but also the types of opposition to it identified in section 3: 
sharp polarisation mainly gave way to a broad consensus. Stoic ethical authors of the Imperial 
period, such as Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, do not display the hard-nosed 
insistence on unconditional property rights, law and strict justice, self-consciously hostile to 
strong ideals of community, attested for some later Hellenistic Stoics.    
 
Despite these developments, more radical Classicising rhetoric did not entirely die out in the 
Greek cities. The old-fashioned ideal of civic autonomy and democracy could be expressed 
very trenchantly in civic language.190 Moreover, as Ma has shown, advocates of moderate 
Classicism had to challenge more radical forms directly, suppressing the connotations of 
                                                 
189 Strabo 13.1.54; cf. Hatzimichali 2013: 13–14. 
190 See Thornton 2007: esp. 159–66, interpreting the political situation and rhetoric attested in 
SEG 53.659, from Maroneia; he cites earlier Greek parallels for that document’s rhetoric about 
civic autonomy (pp. 149–52). Thornton is in dialogue with the alternative, more oligarchic 
interpretation of the Maroneian situation in Wörrle 2004. 
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egalitarian community intrinsic to their cherished Classical canon.191 Posidonius’ satirical 
portrayal of Athenion’s revolt is itself an important part of this story. By making Athenion 
appear ridiculous in his attempts to yoke together Classical Athenian radical democracy and 
Classical Athenian culture as an indissoluble pair, Posidonius contributed to detaching 
Classical Athens’ cultural, intellectual and even ethical legacy from its radical democratic 
legacy. The resulting more cultural ideal of Athens was crucial to subsequent Roman 
Athenocentric philhellenism (see Ma, this volume). 
 
There would, therefore, have been obvious incentives for Posidonius to invent a connection 
between radical democrats and Peripatetics in early first-century Athens. Nevertheless, some 
independent evidence lends historical plausibility to his account’s general contours. Some 
sources indicate that philosophers of different schools were involved in political unrest at 
Athens around this time, both clashing with one another and becoming involved in wider social 
conflicts.192 Moreover, it is quite plausible that this chapter’s various different types of later 
Hellenistic appropriation of certain Classical civic ideals, democratic and philosophical, came 
together in Athens in 88 BC in an ostensibly incongruous coalition: a single, united, now 
particularly extreme political reaction, shared between erstwhile rivals, against Roman-
inspired developments in the Greek world.193 This would have been a major intensification of 
                                                 
191 Compare Ma (2000b); also (1994). Among ancient texts, see, in particular, Plut. Prae. ger. 
reip. 814a–c, with de Ste Croix 1981: 310–31. 
192 Cic. Leg. 1.53; Athen. Deipnosophistae Book XIII, 611b. See also Cic. Brut. 306; cf. Malitz 
1983: 343–4. In general, see Ferrary 1988: 435–6, 476–81. 
193 There is probably, however, too little distinctively Aristotelian about Agora I 2351, an 
inscription recording early first-century BC constitutional changes, to merit the hypothesis of 
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the tendency already evident in section 4, in which citizens of later Hellenistic Mylasa and 
Priene appear to have adopted Classical philosophical ideals of solidarity in order to assert that 
private wealth must be used in keeping with the needs and values of the wider community, 
represented as a demos in their inscriptions. 
 
This conclusion about the historicity of the alleged events at Athens in 88 BC is reinforced by 
another detail from Posidonius’ account, which Posidonius himself presents as merely 
incidental. Posidonius gives some background information concerning Athenion’s Peripatetic 
associate Apellikon of Teos. Before becoming involved in Athenion’s regime, Apellikon had 
dedicated much effort to collecting ancient written works. He had not only bought the original 
copies of Aristotle’s works, but also secreted some ancient Athenian decrees from the Athenian 
archives into his collection.194 It is possible that Apellikon was simply an antiquarian, interested 
in collecting both old works of philosophy and ancient decrees. Could Apellikon not, however, 
have been interested in both types of document for far more pressing political reasons? Both 
Aristotle’s books and ancient Athenian democratic decrees were potent symbols of central 
Classical Athenian ideals of civic self-government and collective endeavour. Those old ideals 
appear to have assumed a new and urgent relevance in the later Hellenistic world.195 
                                                 
Peripatetic influence in that case; but such influence is posited in Oliver 1980; Antela-
Bernárdez 2009. 
194 Posidonius fr. 253, ll. 147–57; see also Hatzimachali 2013: 4. 
195 Apellikon reportedly himself defended Aristotle’s political engagement, writing favourably 
about Aristotle’s friendship with the dynast Hermias of Atarneus (Aristocles of Messana, fr. 2, 
section 13; Ferrary 1988: 474). Could Apellikon even have been the source, with his interest 
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in decrees and Aristotelianism, of the Hellenistic forged Athenian honorary decree for Aristotle 
(Haake 2013: 94–6)? M. Haake suggested this possibility to me. 
